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Why didn't Obama go to France?
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Funding new submarines outside the Navy? – Stripes
NEWPORT NEWS, Va. (Tribune News Service) — Newport News Shipbuilding has a stake in a new and potentially divisive method for funding a future class of submarine, a project considered the Navy’s top priority.
At issue is how to replace the aging fleet of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, often referred to as “boomers,” which play an increasingly important role in America’s ability to deliver a nuclear punch.
Replacing the Ohio-class fleet with new submarines has been deemed so important — and so difficult to afford in tight fiscal times — that Congress has proposed funding them outside the Navy’s $15.7 billion annual shipbuilding budget.
via Funding new submarines outside the Navy? – Stripes.
I think it’s pretty important to do so.
Back when the original “41 for Freedom” Polaris/Poseidon SSBN boats were built, the budget was in the regular Navy SCN account. But at the same time, the Air Force budget was also buying not just 1000 Minuteman missiles, but the massive infrastructure investment for them as well. The Army budget of the time kinda took it in the shorts until Vietnam forced their share to go up.
The point is, while it looked like the regular budget was covering the cost of both SSBNs and the rest of the fleet, the reality is that the budget was boosted across the board specifically for strategic programs.
Today, there simply is no other major strategic (that’s a fancy way of saying nuclear) program in the works. But the other services will cry if the Navy suddenly gets a bump in its procurement dollars, on the grounds that a bump for the Navy is a hit to the Air Force and Army budgets.
By isolating the SSBN budget, Congress can avoid that. Further, with even a modicum of sense, it can restrain some of the worst impulses of the procurement nightmare, and impose some level of fiscal sense on the project.
The bottom line is, the SSBN may be a “Navy” program, but in fact it is a national assets, the single most valid nuclear deterrent we have.
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ISIS “Cyber Caliphate” Hacks U.S. Military Command Accounts | TechCrunch
The Cyber Caliphate, a hacker group claiming association with terrorist group ISIS, today seized control of the @CENTCOM Twitter and YouTube accounts that represents U.S. central military command.
The hackers tweeted a Pastebin message titled “Pentagon networks hacked. AMERICAN SOLDIERS WE ARE COMING, WATCH YOUR BACK. ISIS. #CyberCaliphate”. The message includes links to supposedly confidential US Army files, though there’s indication that some of these files may have previously been made public or aren’t highly confidential.
Even if only the CENTCOM social accounts were compromised, it shows the sorry state of cybersecurity in the US government. And if the hackers were able to access confidential documents, it could show that ISIS is a more formidable cyber-opponent than some expected.
via ISIS “Cyber Caliphate” Hacks U.S. Military Command Accounts | TechCrunch.
The government spends billions upon billions on IT, and yet is always terribly far behind the curve, with obsolete infrastructure and burdensome, yet ineffective security.
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FIFI 2015 Spring Tour Stops Announced
The Commemorative Air Force Air Power History Tour, featuring the iconic Boeing B-29 Superfortress FIFI, will visit airports in Arizona, California, Nevada and Texas starting February 18 and ending April 3. The B-29 will be accompanied by a variety of other vintage military aircraft at each stop. The airplanes will be on display and selling rides at tour stops that include Tucson, Phoenix and Mesa in Arizona; Camarillo, Palm Springs and Van Nuys in California; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Amarillo, Texas.
via FIFI 2015 Spring Tour Stops Announced.
Maybe once they get Doc flying, they’ll have a bidding war for flights.
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Emily Bett Rickards
Any fans of the CW’s Arrow here? If so, you’ve certainly seen this week’s hottie, Emily Bett Rickards.
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Mini-14 a la Francais
In the comments on our post of the French police shooting at the Kosher store, Chrispy mentioned in the comments that some French police forces are armed with the Ruger Mini-14. Indeed they are. And Ian at Forgotten Weapons, of course has the details.
When French national police and security forces decided to replace the MAT-49 submachine gun as a standard weapon, they decided to look for a light carbine. Something less obviously military than the FAMAS was desired, and the natural choice was the Ruger Mini-14, whose slightly civilian appearance is often considered to be one of its primary strengths. Ruger licensed the design to the French, who have assembled them in-country with a few changes from the normal production model we are used to seeing here in the US.

One of our very first purchases was a Ruger Mini-14 5R Ranch Rifle. Basically it was a Mini-14 with the receiver pre-milled to accept scope rings, and with a very primitive flip up sight, instead of the more robust aperture sights seen here. It came standard with a 5 round magazine, but we also had four 30 round magazines, because we like shooting lots of bullets.
It was a nice rifle, quite handy and comfortable, and back then (1987) very reasonably priced. It wasn’t quite as accurate as our M16, but it was, in general, more accurate than we were.
The comments at Forgotten Weapons have an interesting discussion on how the Mini-14 used to be a weapon of choice for many police agencies, and how and why that seems to have changed.
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So… Seahawks!
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Toxic Leadership
The quality of leadership in any large organization such as the Army will, one suspects, be distributed along a bell curve. At every level, from Corporals and Sergeants to Colonels and Generals, you’ll find gifted, brilliant leaders, and you’ll find incompetents and bullies.
I’m not exactly qualified to discuss the traits of leaders at the highest levels of the organization, but I have quite a bit of experience with leaders, both good and bad, at the battalion, company, platoon, and squad level.
Top commanders in the U.S. Army have announced publicly that they have a problem: They have too many “toxic leaders” — the kind of bosses who make their employees miserable. Many corporations share a similar problem, but in the Army’s case, destructive leadership can potentially have life or death consequences. So, some Army researchers are wondering if toxic officers have contributed to soldiers’ mental health problems.
One of those researchers is Dave Matsuda. In 2010, then-Brig. Gen. Pete Bayer, who was supervising the Army’s drawdown in Iraq, asked Matsuda to study why almost 30 soldiers in Iraq had committed or attempted suicides in the past year.
“We got to a point where we were exceptionally frustrated by the suicides that were occurring,” Bayer says. “And quite honestly feeling — at least I was — helpless to some degree that otherwise good young men and women were taking their lives.”
ADP 6-22, the Army’s doctrinal publication on Leadership, describes toxic leadership.
Occasionally, negative leadership occurs in an organization. Negative leadership generally leaves people and organizations in a worse condition than when the leader follower relationship started. One form of negative leadership is toxic leadership. Toxic leadership is a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance. This leader lacks concern for others and the climate of the organization, which leads to short- and long-term negative effects. The toxic leader operates with an inflated sense of self-worth and from acute self-interest. Toxic leaders consistently use dysfunctional behaviors to deceive, intimidate, coerce, or unfairly punish others to get what they want for themselves. The negative leader completes short-term requirements by operating at the bottom of the continuum of commitment, where followers respond to the positional power of their leader to fulfill requests. This may achieve results in the short term, but ignores the other leader competency categories of leads and develops. Prolonged use of negative leadership to influence followers undermines the followers’ will, initiative, and potential and destroys unit morale.
There’s that type of toxic leader. One who acts from self interest, often has narcissistic traits, feels that others are out to get them, sees accomplishment of the mission only as a means to promoting their own interests and career and fabulously talented at taking credit for all successes, while laying all blame on subordinates. Ironically, having destroyed any sense of teamwork, that blame is often laid at the foot of “disloyalty.” That last is an interesting bit. In the Army, you’re expected to display some level of personal loyalty to your boss, not because of fealty, but because we operate on the default presumption that the boss is likewise loyal to us, and more importantly, that the boss is loyal to the unit, institution and mission of the unit and Army. When the leader’s loyalties are not so aligned, of course it creates a conflict for the subordinate. Having served in such an environment, I can tell you that alone causes enormous, unrelenting stress.
Going back to the NPR piece, it looks at a somewhat different scenario.
Costabile says he never heard the term toxic leadership while he was in the Army. But he says some of his own leaders started tormenting him psychologically three years ago in Afghanistan, and the abuse continued when he came home in 2011 to Fort Carson in Colorado. He says those leaders didn’t scream at him, they ostracized him. And the more he felt like he was falling apart, the worse it got. Army records show he had “major depressive episodes” and “multiple hospitalizations.”
“Like the kid that was picked last for kickball in school, you know? I get the jobs that nobody wanted to do. Take out the trash, you’re going to sweep the floor, you’re going to mop the hallway. And it’s like, why?” Costabile says.
Every unit has “that guy.” For whatever reason, they have difficulty adapting to life in the service. Maybe they’re a little socially awkward, maybe they are lazy, or what have you. And leadership tries to knock a little sense into them. At the small unit level, you can lead with a carrot, or with a stick. And it is awfully easy to reach for the stick.
But it doesn’t take much for an already marginal troop to become ostracized. Your peers shun you, your supervisors sometimes forget to develop you, and instead marginalize you, your officers are frustrated with you, and soon hold you in contempt. An otherwise reasonably healthy organization develops a habit of minor cruelty.
Our disaffected soldier quickly loses trust in his unit, peers and leadership. Feeling alone (rather justifiably), that lack of trust is reciprocated. When you’re on the outs, it is natural to withdraw and become defensive, and passive aggressive. That behavior reinforces the leadership’s perception of the problem soldier.
At the worst, the soldier becomes a suicide statistic. At best, our problem child leaves the service, and spends the rest of his life resenting the Army. The more common outcome is the Army has to administratively separate the soldier before his commitment is complete, thus wasting the Army’s time and resources, and consuming a disproportionate amount of the leader’s time.
Understand, there are cases, many cases, where an administrative separation is called for, and this type of toxic environment is not to blame. The service is a challenging life under the best of circumstances, and not everyone is successful. It is often in the best interests of both the Army and the soldier to part ways. Or even if it is only in the Army’s best interest, it is still justified.
But every leader who has “that guy” in his unit has to ask himself, has his leadership contributed in making the soldier a failure? Is the lack of trust and loyalty up and down the chain of command due to a failure to mentor, counsel, lead and care for a soldier? If you have a soldier that feels so persecuted that he cannot trust you, how can your other soldiers trust you not to turn on them likewise?
Leadership, especially leading soldiers, is very much a human endeavor. You can study it from Army manuals, and other publications and books. You might have a natural talent for it, or have learned the ropes through hard experience. But you will make errors. The challenge is to recognize, hopefully early, when you have made errors, and mitigate the impact of them. The willingness to undertake such introspection is a daunting challenge. After all, we’re all the hero in our own story. But good leaders learn to do so, and internalize the lessons learned.
Bad leaders blame a subordinate for their failings.
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The Army Operating Concept
We shared a copy of the Army’s Operating Concept a while back, but never got around to reading it. A slightly updated version came across our desk this week, and we’ve finally started delving into it.
The AOC isn’t the current Army doctrine. What it is is a framework to look to the future and make best guesses as to what future conflict will look like in the near term, and how the Army should be shaped to best suit that.
Spoiler alert- the first parts, the prefaces and first chapters are pure word salad, a cornicopia of buzzwords that would make a shyster business consultant blush.
Somewhat surprisingly though, the second part offers a blunt assessment of our potential adversaries, with only the minimum of jargon. Just as a slight taste, here’s the assessment of Russia:
(2) Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and use of conventional and unconventional land forces in Ukraine suggest that Russia is determined to expand its territory and assert its power on the Eurasian landmass. Russia deployed and integrated a range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic means to conduct what some analysts have described as “non-linear” operations.32 Russia conducted operations to pursue its war aims below the threshold that would elicit a concerted North Atlantic Treaty Organization response. In addition, Russia used cyberspace capabilities and social media to influence perceptions at home and abroad and provide cover for large-scale military operations. While the long-term results of the incursion into Ukraine are not yet certain, Russia demonstrated the centrality of land forces in its effort to assert power and advance its interests in former Soviet states. Without a viable land force capable of opposing the Russian army and its irregular proxies, such adventurism is likely to continue undeterred.33 Russia’s actions highlight the value of land forces to deter conflict as well as special operations and conventional force capability to project national power and exert influence in political contests.
The Obama administration, having done nothing to deter Russia from invading Ukraine, simply pretends the situation doesn’t exist. The Army, however, has to at least acknowledge reality. It’s not suggesting the US should undertake any actions here, just noting both the methodology that Russia has used, and that such a similar “non-linear” approach, having worked once, will likely be used again, and the Army had better start thinking about ways to respond.
Another theme that is showing up is, in as the Navy and Air Force posit AirSea Battle as the key to the pivot to Asia, the Army is attempting to show the centrality of land power (that is, the Army) to any theater of war. First, that’s where the people are. Second, the Army provides capabilities that the other services simply cannot. Intelligence, command and control, interface with other nations command structures, engineering and logistics are all areas that either the Army alone has sufficient capacity, or where supplementing the other services with Army assets is likely a best practice.
My own way of describing the Army’s vision for a future theater is this- the Army sees itself serving as the prime contractor, and then subcontracting out the various warfighting elements to the component services, be it Army, Air Force or Navy.
Still not done reading the AOC, so I’ll probably babble on it some more later.
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What a difference a decade makes
In cleaning up my office, I found “The New Age of Exploration: NASA’s Direction for 2005 and Beyond”. Now that it’s 2015, let’s see what we accomplished and what died on the vine.

The first thing to remember is that the Space Shuttle was still grounded at the time and would not fly until July 2005. Administrator Sean O’Keefe talked about President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration, begun in 2004 and cancelled by Obama. O’Keefe was already planning on leaving NASA and “move on to other challenges.”
Some of the long-term objectives listed were.
(more…)
