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  • Redefining veterans proving to be divisive issue in South Dakota – Veterans – Stripes

    Despite it being overwhelmingly approved by the South Dakota House of Representatives earlier this week, an Aberdeen lawmaker believes it’s still possible to derail a proposal that would change the way the state defines its military veterans.

    Republican Rep. Dan Kaiser said Thursday that the unexpectedly easy passage (63-4) of House Bill 1179 on Tuesday does not necessarily mean it’s clear sailing for supporters of the measure. The bill would remove a stipulation that requires members of the South Dakota armed forces reserves and National Guard to serve 90 days of “continuous federalized active military duty” in order to receive veteran status.

    The House’s action has displeased a number of veterans around the state.

    via Redefining veterans proving to be divisive issue in South Dakota – Veterans – Stripes.

    I find it distressing that other veterans are pushing against this redefinition of veteran status. I might have spent my fair share of time teasing the Weekend Warrior crowd, but the fact is, one who signs on the bottom line, and serves his or her state and country is a vet.

    Service members don’t get much choice in just how they serve. Whether they’re called up, deployed, sent into combat, those are things beyond their control for the most part.

    And let us not forget that service in the reserve components has challenges that active duty members don’t face. Many reservists actually spend a great deal of money simply attending their drills, to the point where some are actually losing money by staying in.

    That’s not even taking into consideration the disruption to their primary employment if and when they are activated. Federal law provides protection for the civilian jobs of reserve component members called to active duty, but enforcing that law is difficult, and many employers have been known to ignore it, safe in the knowledge that they’ll almost certainly get away with either discriminating in the hiring process, or finding creative ways to fire reservists.

    The benefits South Dakota are offering here are modest. The service reservists are offering to their state and nation may be modest as well (or not), but should also be recognized.

  • Vice Admiral Rowden's Message

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    You can read the text of it over at Salamander’s place.  Micromanagement?  Possibly.  Necessary?  Some folks, among which is a guy named Greenert, seem to think so.  From where I sit, it seems there is some serious concern (finally) on the part of Navy leadership from the CNO on down, including SURFPAC, that our numbered Fleet Commanders don’t know how to fight their fleets, that Task Force Commanders do not know how to fight their task forces, nor Battle Group Commanders their Battle Groups, or individual COs and Officers, their warships.   There is, it is suspected, a lack of understanding of warfighting at all levels.  From the Operational Arts, to doctrine and tactics, down to techniques, and procedures, there is an alarming lack of understanding in areas for which we should strive for mastery.  In addition, it is likely that there is serious question about the true state of readiness of our fleet and the ships and aircraft (and Sailors) which comprise it.  Maintenance, training, proficiency, mindset, all these are suspect.

    SandF2Oct14

    I think SURFPAC’s message is a very good step in the right direction.  It may also shake out the most egregious impediments to training for war, both self-inflicted and externally imposed.  This includes peripheral tasks that take up inordinate time and attention, maintenance and manpower shortcomings that render weapons and engineering systems non-mission capable, and jumping through burdensome administrative hoops required to perform the most basic of combat training.

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    I cannot say whether or not VADM Rowden dislikes Mission Command.  I hope that he does not, because the ability of junior commanders to take the initiative and act boldly across widely-flung battlefields in the absence of orders has been the critical element of success for many centuries.  But Mission Command requires junior leaders who are positively imbued in their craft, and senior leaders who understand what must be done and can clearly express their intent (and then have the courage to trust their subordinates).   The entirety of the US Navy, more so perhaps than the other services, must rely on such leadership for its survival in combat with an enemy.  Unfortunately, the Navy may be the service that has become the most over-supervised and zero-defect-laden bastion of micromanagement in all of DoD.

    Gunnery training aboard U.S.S. Astoria (CA-34), spring 1942.

    Vice Admiral Rowden’s message has an almost desperate tone to it.   As if, to quote Service, Navy leadership realizes that it is later than you think.  One cannot help but be reminded of the myriad comments from US cruiser sailors in 1942.  Following initial and deadly encounters with a skilled and fearsome Japanese Navy in the waters off the Solomons, many deckplate sailors swore they would never again bitch about the seemingly incessant gunnery and damage control drills that interrupted their shipboard lives.    Like 1942, a Naval clash against a near-peer who can muster temporary advantage will be a costly affair where even the winner is badly bloodied.  Unlike 1942, there is no flood of new warships on the slips which can make good such losses.

    ******************************************************

    Words from an earlier post of USS Hugh W. Hadley, on the picket line off Okinawa, reinforce the importance of what VADM Rowden wants:

    LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

                          1.  It must be impressed that constant daily drills in damage control using all personnel on the ship and especially those who are not in the regular damage control parties will prove of  value when emergencies occur.  The various emergency pumps which were on board were used effectively to put out fires.  Damage control schools proved their great value and every member of the crew is now praising this training.

                          2.  I was amazed at the performance of the 40 and 20 guns.  Contrary to my expectation, those smaller guns shot down the bulk of the enemy planes. Daily the crews had dinned into their minds the following order “LEAD THAT  PLANE”.  Signs were painted at the gun stations as follows “LEAD THAT PLANE”.  It worked, they led and the planes flew right through our projectiles.

    Not the things of (fill in the blank) History Month or of SAPR or “diversity” training….

  • SS Eastland

    A while back, Spill shared his visit to the excellent Chicago Maritime Museum, and that prompted this post about the USS Wilmette. The Wilmette started life as the SS Eastland, which sank pierside, with great loss of life.

    Now, gCaptain has uncovered long lost film of the aftermath of the sinking.

    And…

    Of roughly 2500 passengers aboard, 844 were killed.

  • Citing “Instability,” ROTC Cadets Dissolve GUSA in Coup | The Georgetown Heckler

    SELLINGER LOUNGE – Violent clashes erupted throughout campus last night as ROTC cadets stormed Healy Hall and the Georgetown University Student Association offices in Sellinger in an apparent coup of the student government. Students studying in UG witnessed the ROTC cadets parading through Sellinger, brandishing blue plastic rifles and ordering students to drop their coffees and crouch under the study tables.

    “We have come to put an end to the injustice and corruption that GUSA has brought upon the student body,” announced Cadet Marcus Briarwood (SFS ’15), the self-declared ring leader of the ROTC revolt, over WGTB radio shortly after the raid. “No longer will we tolerate an administration spoiled by power-hungry congressional interns who fail to see that their ineptitude is gutting the Hilltop from within. The ineffective institution of GUSA has failed to protect Georgetown from the growing presence of international students and – even worse – transfers. Under the guidance of ROTC, security is the number one priority, which why I am calling for the immediate dissolution of GUSA and trial of its members for high treason against the University. In its place, I am honored to announce the creation of the Department of Hilltop Security, which will monitor the every aspect of the Hilltop and eliminate any and all potential threats.”

    via Citing “Instability,” ROTC Cadets Dissolve GUSA in Coup | The Georgetown Heckler.

  • Bosch- Finally.

    Fans of the Michael Connelley books featuring LAPD Detective Hieronymus Bosch are probably aware that Amazon Prime has had the pilot episode of a TV adaptation available for some time. The good news is that as of today, the full 10 episodes are available for streaming.

  • 22 Marines Exposed to Halon Fire Retardant in Training Accident | Military.com

    TWENTYNINE PALMS, Calif. — Nearly two dozen Marines were treated for exposure to a fire retardant gas Thursday after an extinguishing system accidentally went off in an assault vehicle during a training exercise, but there were no serious injuries, officials said.

    An equipment malfunction caused the fire suppression system to go off inside a tank-like amphibious assault vehicle during an afternoon exercise at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, base spokesman Dave Marks said.

    There was no fire or explosion but 22 Marines were exposed to halon, Marks said.

    All of them were taken to the base hospital. Three were kept overnight for observation and the rest were released to resume training, Marks said.

    via 22 Marines Exposed to Halon Fire Retardant in Training Accident | Military.com.

    Halon discharges are fairly common, usually the result of some dumbassery on the part of a junior troop (face reddens a bit here).

    We’ve noted before that armored vehicles tend to be filled with a lot of very flammable things, such as fuel, ammunition and people. It only makes sense to provide a robust fire suppression system. Older systems used CO2. The problem with CO2 was that a sufficient concentration of it was enough to not only extinguish the fire, but also rapidly extinguish the crew. Halon works better at suppressing a fire while also allowing the crew enough oxygen to breath long enough to abandon the vehicle.

    The primary goal of the fire suppression system is to save the crew. If it also saves the vehicle, that’s a bonus.

    In peacetime, the fire suppression system is (usually) manually initiated. There are internal and external “T” handles that are pulled to discharge the Halon.

    In combat, there an automatic system. Sensors inside the vehicle detect an explosion and almost instantly unload the Halon. It’s… loud. It doesn’t take long at all for the bottles to empty. More of a “boom!” than a “whoosh.”

    Ships use similar fire suppression systems in their engineering spaces, though I have no idea what the current agent used is.

  • Bravo Zulu, Navy

    You may recall the horrific mudslide that killed 43 people in the small community of Oso, Washington last year.

    One of the first responses was by the duty Search and Rescue helicopter stationed at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington.

    And now, the crew of that helicopter has received recognition for their acts, which include saving seven souls.

    The Navy helicopter crew first on the scene at the Oso mud slide was finally honored Wednesday, and one member was awarded the country’s highest non-combat medal.
    “It’s an honor to represent 7 million Washingtonians to pay our respects to the heroes that we are honoring today,” said Gov. Jay Inslee at a ceremony inside the Capitol rotunda on “Navy Day.”
    The Naval aviators who flew the rescue mission and the federal fire fighters who went on the mission with them were all honored for their actions on that day 11 months ago. Seven people are alive because of their efforts.
    They responded in their MH-60 Sierra helicopter and had no idea what to expect at Oso. They thought they were heading to an avalanche of snow. Instead it was an avalanche of mud.
    “Looked like rolling hills of mud, like you were looking out over an ocean with rolling waves. That’s what it looked like almost,” said Lt. Cmdr. David Waner.

    One minor quibble. LCDR Warner was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal, which is the highest award for valor not involving combat.

  • Government Regulation of the Internet, Part II

    A certainty once the Feds barge their way into screwing it up.  (An accurate, if not exact, depiction of the Kafka-esque experiences I had running a small business and trying to be verified as a Veteran-owned small business, incidentally.  A process not required of women or minority-owned small businesses.)   More gummint nincompoops without motive for profit, efficiency, or customer satisfaction, but WITH a political agenda, unfettered and unsupervised.     Because Verizon and Level 3 shouldn’t be trusted to run the internet efficiently.   But maybe we can have “electronic justice”.

    H/T:  Brian P.

  • Torpedo!

    Take a look at these three ships sunk as targets for torpedoes.

    None of the ships was actually struck by a torpedo. Rather, the torpedo passes beneath the target, exploding under the keel of the ship. The first blast wave does significant damage. But an effect known as the bubble jet is the true shipkiller.  The explosion causes a bubble in the water. As the bubble collapses, it pushes water upward, in effect shooting a massive water hammer into the hull of the ship. This effect has long been known, since the early days of naval mines.

    You’re probably familiar with the troubles US submariners (and to a lesser extent, destroyermen and torpedo bomber pilots) had with torpedoes in the first year and a half of World War II in the Pacific. One of the major problems was that the US torpedoes were designed to operate just like those in the video, that is, explode under the target’s keel. First, the magnetic exploder was tested in unrealistic conditions before being fielded, and turned out to be wholly unreliable. Further, the depth control mechanism of US torpedoes also consistently sent torpedoes about 10 feet deeper than set, further exacerbating the unreliability of the magnetic exploder.

    The remedies for those problems were relatively simple; the depth would be set with the inaccuracy in mind, and the magnetic exploder was removed, relying instead on a contact exploder to detonate the warhead along the side of the ship. This method would not produce the same terminal effects, but an explosion alongside was better than no explosion at all.

    That, however, turned out not to be the answer after all. It turned out, the contact exploder was itself flawed. Sub skippers would patiently, and with great skill, stalk their targets to achieve the perfect shot into the enemy flank, only to hear a thud, or worse, a series of thuds, as torpedoes slammed into the side of Japanese ships… and failed to explode. The faulty contact exploder relied on a firing striker that was too thin, too flimsy to withstand a solid hit. A glancing blow would usually yield an explosion. It would be late in 1943 before an improved contact exploder would be fielded.

  • Make. A. Damn. Decision.

    BJ Armstrong has, among other writings, a nice little piece on Admiral William Sims over at USNI Blog, which includes this wonderful snippet:

    Sims had the ability, essential to a naval officer, of making decisions and making them quickly if necessary. He expected the same of those under him. There are several versions of a story which illustrates this characteristic. The captain of a destroyer on his way from Newport to Charleston sent this dispatch to Sims, whose flagship was anchored in Chesapeake Bay. “My starboard engine is disabled, shall I continue to Charleston under one engine or put in to Lynnhaven Roads and effect repairs?” Promptly came the answer from Sims, “Yes.” The puzzled skipper sent another dispatch saying he did not understand and repeated his original query. This time, equally promptly came the reply, “No.” I once intercepted a message from Sims to one of his destroyer captains tersely instructing the officer, “Don’t ask questions, act.”

    One of the most difficult things to instill in a leader is decisiveness. Much is written about the need for leaders to inspire teams, and establish goals and build consensus and whatnot. And those are indeed facets of leadership. But one key task a leader must execute is to simply make a decision.

    Make. A. Damn. Decision.

    That’s not to say that decisions should be made rashly. As in so much else, the Army has a process to support decision making, named, rather unimaginatively The Military Decision Making Process.

    Copy/Pasta from Wiki:

    1. Receipt of Mission
    2. Mission Analysis
    3. Course of action (COA) Development
    4. COA Analysis (aka Wargaming)
    5. COA Comparison
    6. COA Approval
    7. Orders Production

    That seems simple enough. You receive a mission from your higher headquarters, figure out what it is exactly you are to accomplish, and kick around different possible ways to accomplish the mission. Decide which plan to go with, then put the word out to everyone how to go about it.

    Ah… if only…

    One of the possible traps of MDMP may be familiar to many outside the military- paralysis by analysis. It’s very easy for staffs and commanders to focus on the Process part of MDMP and forget the whole point is the Decision part.

    Another problem is, some people are simply afraid to commit themselves to a course of action. Every decision has consequences, sometimes good, sometimes bad. Indeed, usually there are both good and bad consequences to making a decision. There is always a desire to gain one more piece of information, examine one more possible course of action. And so, they fail to decide. Which is a decision all its own.

    Which brings us to this:

    “By the spring of 2014, the ISIS captors, we’re told, felt so confident in their situation that there was very little visible security around the hostages. And by May, eight Western hostages were held together in one location,” Herridge said.

    Via Ace.

    There may well have been issues that argued against attempting a rescue of Ms. Mueller and the other hostages. Hostage rescue attempts are very high risk under the best of circumstances. But, at least in hindsight, the risks certainly are less than the near certainty of execution at the hands of Islamic fiends. One finds it difficult, especially in light of the dithering shown by Obama in authorizing the raid on the Bin Laden compound, to believe that Obama made a rational decision to not attempt a rescue, but instead simply made the default decision to do nothing.