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  • Carrier Think Pieces Today

    We first saw this looooong piece at USNI from Professor Moore.

    Just four days ahead of the 73rd anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy announced its intention to award Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc (HII). approximately $4 billion to construct the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) super carrier, the second vessel of the new Gerald R. Ford-class of carriers. The cost has raised eyebrows, as the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) experienced cost overruns of 22 percent.

    Additionally, debate is raging over the utility of the aircraft carrier and whether it’s even relevant anymore in the face of China’s new, lethal anti-ship missiles. It’s a debate worth having, but it needs to be rooted in realistic naval principles and war precedents, not politics and hype.

    And addressing that piece is none other than Bull Halsey! We suspect that might be a nom de plume.

    “The New Strategic Realities of U.S. Carrier Operations.”  As much of the East Coast naval establishment sits at home with their Snuggies and bottles of craft beer (or for some, sitting in a tree stand freezing your keester off), this is sure to be heavily forwarded around the web (thanks, Al Gore).

    Moore’s piece touches a particular nerve with me:  the American aircraft carrier and how Americans use her.  It is no longer self-evident and requires a generation of both young and old aviators and ship-drivers to safeguard.

    First, our ability to justify the existence of the aircraft carrier beyond the battles of WWII is essential.  It’s great to talk about Coral Sea and Midway, but those events took place more than seven decades ago, and for a force that pegs itself as an innovative one, able to counter the threats of today and tomorrow, it strikes as unimaginative.  There are at least hundreds of examples of CVNs providing critical support or comprising the sole option for offensive or defensive American military operations in the many decades that have followed WWII.  Let’s talk about them candidly.

    For the most part, US aircraft carriers have been used as supplemental airfields for power projection in our nation’s wars since World War II. What they haven’t much been called to do is act in the sea control role. Or, if you will, fighting a war at sea. Some, but not much.

    The primary reason for that is not that carriers are bad at war at sea. Instead, they’re so good no one has realistically been able to challenge our fleet for many years. The Soviet Union was the only nation to come close to mounting a credible threat of parity, and that was through a sea control fleet that couldn’t realistically project power to our shores, whereas the whole point of the Lehman/Watkins Maritime Strategy was to project power against the Soviet Union itself.

    Moore spends a good deal of time discussing the threats to modern carrier operations, and not surprisingly, Halsey adds a rebuttal:

    Second, the author paraphrases Robert Haddick’s dire swarm supposition of hundreds of Chinese ASCMs descending upon an unsuspecting aircraft carrier.  The problem with Haddick’s logic–and Moore’s, by association–is that it presupposes a sort of inevitable willingness on the part of the People’s Republic to launch such costly attacks that would result in unquestionable war.  Though we all remember Pearl Harbor, we also remember the children’s tale of the “boogeyman” in the closet.  We must not allow the fear of a missile whose very use would be loaded in incredible geopolitical meaning to be the tail that wags the dog.

    Of course, that’s a political consideration, a subject that Halsey spends a fair bit of time on, rightly.

    What isn’t sufficiently addressed, to my lights, is the actual difficulty China (or anyone else) would have massing missile attacks on a fleet. Probably no other organization in the world has as robust a maritime ISR capability for targeting a surface fleet than the US Navy, and even we can have trouble finding our own carriers.

    Alfred Thayer Mahan would find this debate about the threat of shore based ASCMs and missile armed fast attack craft little different than the Jeffersonian vision of gunboats and coast artillery defending the shores from the line of battle of the Royal Navy. The technology has changed much, and the ranges are greater, but the fundamental concept of a fleet in being able to sail to the enemy shore at the time and place of his choosing to impose his will is very much still the case.

    And while our skills seemed to have diminished somewhat from lack of practice, it’s not like we didn’t used to know how to place entire carrier task forces well within the range of an opponent shore without them even knowing it.

    Control of the air is a prerequisite for success in battle today, and only the carrier can provide that for substantial naval forces far from our shores. Further, the carrier remains the centerpiece of our ability to execute both sea control and power projection in the maritime space. Carriers alone are not sufficient to successfully challenge the Chinese or any other near peer power at sea, but absent the carrier, the any challenge is simply impossible.

  • Final Navy EA-6B Prowler will fly into history at NAS Whidbey Island open house | Whidbey Crosswind

    In recognition of the retirement of the venerable EA-6B Prowler, Whidbey Island Naval Air Station is holding an open house.

    The base will also host an EA-6B Prowler Sundown event to highlight the naval history of this iconic aircraft.

    The open house is set for 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., Saturday, June 27 at Ault Field.

    The Navy is retiring the 44-year-old Prowler and replacing the long-range, all-weather electronic attack platform with the EA-18G Growler.

    NAS Whidbey is the Navy’s home base for its electronic attack squadrons including a forward deployed Growler squadron in Japan. As with the Growler, all Prowler squadrons — with exception of four Marine Corps EA-6B squadrons — were based and trained at NAS Whidbey.

    via Final Navy EA-6B Prowler will fly into history at NAS Whidbey Island open house | Whidbey Crosswind.

    “Prowler” and “Whidbey” are virtually synonymous to our mind. We tend to forget about MCAS Cherry Point, since 1. It’s the Marines, and 2. We haven’t been there since around 1970, long before the Marines had Prowlers.

    We sure wish we could make it up to Whidbey this summer, either for this or our 30th high school reunion. Sadly, looks like we’ll be busy.

    Dad cleaned out a lot of pictures and stuff from his “I love me wall” before moving away from Whidbey. Sadly, one picture he got rid of was the one I wanted to keep, showing the variety of airplanes stationed there in August of ’73, when he reported aboard. Going from memory…

    • A-6
    • EA-6B
    • P-2
    • P-3
    • C-118
    • C-119
    • C-1 (might have actually been a US-2)
    • HH-46
    • UH-1
    • C-131

     

     

  • Navy Decommissions SEAL Support Helicopters | FighterSweep

    In a repeat of history, the US Navy is poised to re-learn hard lessons from the past. The Department of the Navy has recently ordered the only two naval helicopter squadrons dedicated to Special Warfare support, HSC-84 and HSC-85, to prepare for decommissioning by the end of FY-15 (September 30, 2015).

    via Navy Decommissions SEAL Support Helicopters | FighterSweep.

    The author presents a well reasoned argument for keeping the SOF tasked squadrons in the fleet.

    On the other hand, there’s no money. The Navy only has so much money to support squadrons, and these aren’t event their squadrons, really.

    Special Operations Command might consist of people who are legally members of one service or another, but as a practical matter, since SOCOM has its own budget, it is virtually a separate service, from an operational point of view.

    And SOCOM does pony up a lot of money for its own helicopters, specifically the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. But that unit is already heavily overtasked.

    But SOCOM wasn’t willing to pony up the money to pay for the two HSC squadrons. They too have money issues.

    And so, dedicated rotary wing support for Naval Special Warfare will go away. Again.

  • Reinventing basic: Graduation comes earlier; 'real life' schooling follows

    The 8½-week journey from recruit to airman will no longer end in a regimented march on a Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland parade field.

    Beginning March 23, 400 recruits will take part in that rite of passage after 7½ weeks of basic military training — then turn back around for a five full days of interactive classroom instruction focused on character development.

    Civilian facilitators and hand-picked military training instructors will lead newly minted airmen through role-playing exercises and real-life scenarios devised to drive home the Air Force core values of integrity, service and excellence.

    “What we expect of airmen as professionals can be dramatically different from the life they’ve come from. We’re going to talk about resiliency, sexual assault, professional relationships, ethics, how we treat each other with dignity and respect,” Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force James Cody said.

    via Reinventing basic: Graduation comes earlier; ‘real life’ schooling follows.

    The article quotes AF officials lamenting that the pace of instruction is so fast that much of the training doesn’t stick in the enlistee’s minds.

    So to address that, they’re going to compress the current 8-1/2 week program of instruction into 7-1/2 weeks.

    And don’t forget that the issues with sexual harassment and assault at AF Basic were with the MTIs, not with the trainees. So of course, the AF answer is to take it out on the trainees.

    And if the Air Force had enough of a problem with fostering a warrior culture, adding a week of touchy feely talkie stuff at the end isn’t going to help.

  • Pentagon: Egypt, UAE Attacking Islamists in Libya Differs From US Bombing ISIS in Iraq | CNS News

    The United States does not support Egyptian and Emirati airstrikes against Islamist militias in Libya because the U.S. believes the crisis in Libya must be resolved politically and without outside interference, a Department of Defense spokesman said Tuesday.

    Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) carrying out airstrikes in Libya was different from U.S. airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant forces in Iraq, Pentagon spokesman Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby told a briefing, because the U.S. was acting in Iraq, in a “very targeted” manner, at the request of its government.

    “This wasn’t some unilateral decision by the United States to strike targets inside Iraq.”

    via Pentagon: Egypt, UAE Attacking Islamists in Libya Differs From US Bombing ISIS in Iraq | CNS News.

    I’m embarrassed for RADM Kirby having to stand there and utter such stupid inanities.

    And again with the political solution meme. There is no political solution in Libya when the factions are committed to a fight to the death.

  • Wow. Just… wow.

    …with Japanese subtitles!

    Oh, to have a smidge of musical talent.  But, alas.  ‘Least I can still enjoy that of others.

     

    H/T

     

    Drum TV/JS

  • Daily Dose of Splodey

  • Hot Summer Night in Sausalito

    CDR Salamander is our local Dutchophile (Hollandophile?) but we too are great admirers of the residents of the Orange nation.  Less taciturn than the Germans, and certainly less snobbish than the French, they are a lot of fun, and wonderful hosts.

    Waaaaaaaaaaaay back in around 1982, a little band named Diesel popped up on the pop charts with a little ditty called “Hot Summer Night in Sausalito.” I usually heard it on the local Canadian FM station, along with bands like Chilliwack,  or that other icon of Canadian pop, Robin Sparkles, so I naturally assumed at the time it was another Canadian band.

    It’s a fun little tune, nothing offensive, no gang signs flashed, no sex, no drugs. The closest they come to that is a burger and root beer.

    Oddly, the band in the video is actually long, long, long running Dutch band Kayak. They’re big in Holland, which, yeah, that’s kinda a joke, but they really are like the national pop band. See, Diesel was something of a side project for Kayak drummer Pim Koopman. After Diesel’s success in the US, ended by some financial shennanigans by their management, Pim (eventually) went back to Kayak. And after his death, Kayak had a tribute concert to him in 2010, a part of which consisted of this fantastic performance of Diesel’s sole charting US single.

    I enjoy seeing the band simply having a great time, and playing the song almost exactly as the studio version.

    The cute redhead? Cindy Oudshoorn.

  • State Dept. Spox on ISIS: “We CANNOT win this war by killing them” » The Right Scoop –

    “We’re killing a lot of them and we’re going to keep killing more of them. So are the Egyptians, so are the Jordanians. They’re in this fight with us. But we cannot win this war by killing them. We cannot kill our way out of this war. We need in the medium to longer term to go after the root causes that leads people to join these groups, whether it’s lack of opportunity for jobs…”

    via State Dept. Spox on ISIS: “We CANNOT win this war by killing them” » The Right Scoop –.

    General LeMay begs to differ.

  • ISIS, Putin, Political Solutions, and Obama

    When even The Atlantic thinks a strategically patient approach to violence is self delusional, you know the bloom is off the Obama foreign policy rose.

    Via Ace:

    The Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), follows a distinctive variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to the Day of Judgment matter to its strategy, and can help the West know its enemy and predict its behavior. Its rise to power is less like the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (a group whose leaders the Islamic State considers apostates) than like the realization of a dystopian alternate reality in which David Koresh or Jim Jones survived to wield absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but some 8 million.

    We have misunderstood the nature of the Islamic State in at least two ways….

    We are misled in a second way, by a well-intentioned but dishonest campaign to deny the Islamic State’s medieval religious nature….

    The most-articulate spokesmen for that position are the Islamic State’s officials and supporters themselves. They refer derisively to “moderns.” In conversation, they insist that they will not–cannot–waver from governing precepts that were embedded in Islam by the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers. They often speak in codes and allusions that sound odd or old-fashioned to non-Muslims, but refer to specific traditions and texts of early Islam….

    The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.

    Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, “the Prophetic methodology,” which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it.

    The Islamic State, is, of course, Islamic. As noted, virtually everything it has done can be justified easily within the pages of the Koran and the Hadiths. Even were that not so, critically, the Islamic State thinks they’re Islamic.  And self evidently, a great number of disaffected Muslims, flowing to Syria and the region from Europe and elsewhere certainly see the Islamic State not only as Islamic, but as the sole truly Islamic state.  It is the one true Islam.

    On the European front, we’ve seen the slow motion invasion of Ukraine, first the Crimea, now the Donbass, by Putin’s Russia. Putin has hardly been shy about proclaiming his intentions to resurrect the empire. Be it tsarist or Soviet, the point wasn’t so much the internal form of government, but the range of borders. Russia has always seen itself as an imperial power, and continues to do so to this day, Putin especially.

    Again, the US response to this has been so hamfisted that Germany’s leader, Merkl, has had to take the point with negotiations with Russia to broker a ceasefire to buy time to prevent the collapse of Ukrainian forces.

    Ace notes the White House response to the slaughter of Coptic Christian Egyptians in Libya is much the same as his reaction to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine- some rather mealy mouthed platitudes.

    This heinous act once again underscores the urgent need for a political resolution to the conflict in Libya, the continuation of which only benefits terrorist groups, including ISIL. We call on all Libyans to strongly reject this and all acts of terrorism and to unite in the face of this shared and growing threat. We continue to strongly support the efforts of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bernardino Leon to facilitate formation of a national unity government and help foster a political solution in Libya.

    But our opponents, be they ISIS in Syria and Iraq, or their Libyan offshoot, or Putin’s Russia, see no need for a political solution. Why should they? They are achieving their goals by force at a cost that is acceptable to them. Simply engaging in the political process would cost them support from their strongest factions. And to date, both Islamist radicals and Putin have had remarkable success with the use of force to achieve their aims.

    We’re big fans of diplomacy and negotiation. Honest, really.

    But the fundamental rule of negotiation is that they can only succeed, absent brute force,  when there exists the potential for mutually acceptable compromise. And in these cases, as in with negotiation with Iran, there simply is no acceptable compromise.

    There are options beyond simply the use of military force. But the administration instead insists that we must forgo those options, and instead aim for a piece of paper that will, in the end, prove as substantial as that waved by Neville Chamberlain in 1938.