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The battle to build the amphibious combat vehicle is down to two competitors, and both prototypes promise a better ride than the amphibious assault vehicle the Corps wants to replace.Indeed, Marines may feel spoiled by either ACV. Both are eight-wheeled vehicles that are more quiet and comfortable than the tracked AAV. The hot exhaust that has nauseated many a Marine has been erased by air conditioning and better ventilation.BAE Systems and SAIC beat out three other manufacturers in a competition to build engineering and manufacturing development prototypes of the vehicle that will ferry Marines ashore and into battle. General Dynamics Land Systems has protested the award.Each of the winning companies, announced Nov. 24, will build 16 eight-wheeled vehicles to be tested over the next two years.

Source: Inside the amphibious vehicles that won the Marines’ $225M contracts

All else being equal, the 13 seater will have a slight edge, as that’s the size of a rifle squad.

A possible new electronic warfare (EW) variant of the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) J-16 twin-seat strike fighter made its first flight on 18 December, according to Chinese sources, potentially adding a significant offensive capability to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).Images of the new variant have emerged on several Chinese military web pages, including a 21 December 2015 video report on the popular Ifeng web page. The most salient modifications are two new wingtip pods similar to the Northrop Grumman AN/ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming Receiver, leading to comparisons with the E/A-18G Growler electronic attack variant of Boeing’s Super Hornet.

Source: Next Big Future: Electronic Warfare version of China J-16 twin seat fighter similar to USA EA-18 Growler

After watching the success of US electronic attack efforts in Desert Storm and over Kosovo in 1999, it makes sense that the Chinese would be willing to copy, or at least emulate, US equipment and doctrine for suppression of enemy air defenses.

The major difference between the Army’s AH-1G Cobra, and the Marines’       AH-1J Sea Cobra was the substitution of the G’s single T53 engine for the T400, basically two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6 engines running as a single power pack. The chin turret with twin 7.62 Miniguns was replaced by the XM197 three barreled 20mm cannon.

The T model for the Marines added TOW missile capability, but was otherwise virtually identical. The J/T SeaCobras would eventually be replaced by the AH-1W, with far more powerful engines and the ability to fire Hellfire missiles, and they themselves have recently been replaced by the AH-1Z, itself so different from the original Cobra series as to be pretty much an entirely different helicopter, sharing only the same general outline.

It should be noted that while the Cobra and the Sea Cobra are quite similar, the Army and the Marines actually developed quite different doctrines of employment for attack helicopters. That’s because the Army and the Marines have different roles and missions. Neither doctrine should be seen as superior or inferior to the other, but as tailored to support its services needs.

Busy day, and not feeling too chipper, so you get videos instead of my deep thoughts.

By the way, with regards to the plotting room, you’ll note that the major weakness of coast artillery fire control was that it depicted where the target was, not where it is, or will be. That is, the time lag between when the azimuths are transmitted and when the location is made is quite lengthy, and the ship has moved from that position while the calculations are made. Given average ship speeds in 1895 when the system was designed, this wasn’t a terrible handicap.

But by the 1920s, when steam turbine ships routinely exceeded 30 knots, that meant hand plotted fires would be practically useless. Indeed, shipboard fire control systems (and anti-aircraft fire control) not only continuously plotted range and bearing (though electromechanical means) they also predicted target location in the future, out to the time of flight for a projectile t0 the predicted range.

Four gunmen who entered the Pathankot base in a hijacked car are dead along with two guards, officials said.The base is on the main highway leading to Indian-administered Kashmir.The incident comes days after the Indian and Pakistani leaders Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif met in Lahore to launch a surprise peace initiative.The whole of India’s Punjab state has been placed on alert.

Source: Gunmen attack India air force base – BBC News

“U.S. land forces will eventually find themselves locked in fights within huge, dense urban environments where skyscrapers tower over enormous shanty towns, and these troops need more realistic training to operate within these future megacities,” Brigadier General Julian Alford of the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory explained earlier this month, as reported by Defense News.

Source: The Four-Floor War – BLDGBLOG

Perhaps the single greatest weakness of the 1980s AirLand Battle doctrine was its steadfast refusal to address Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT).  A clash between the mechanized forces of NATO and the USSR would be swift moving, and, so the doctrine thought, fought outside the cities.

At both the tactical and operational level, the US Army was ill prepared for operations in cities.

That was something of a rude surprise as far back as Operation Just Cause, the US invasion of Panama in 1989, where troops found themselves having to devise their own doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to clear high rise office and apartment buildings in downtown Panama City.

The success of AirLand Battle doctrine in Desert Storm just two years later meant the Army could sweep the issues of urban warfare under the rug again for a few more years.

It wasn’t until after the disastrous fights in Mogadishu in 1998, and operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 that the Army decided it had to intellectually address how to fight in cities.

NATICK , Mass., Dec. 31 (UPI) — The U.S. Army is seeking volunteers to eat its food, specifically a 21-day regimen of nothing but its military rations.The U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine in Natick, Mass., has put out a call for help in studying the effects of consuming what is called MREs, or meals ready to eat, the bagged and vacuum-packed food eaten in the field by Army personnel.It seeks information on “gut health,” how bacteria in soldiers’ digestive systems can be better served by improved MREs. Research will be used to improve the nutritional properties of the food.

Source: Volunteers sought to eat Army rations for three weeks – UPI.com

I’ve gone two weeks on MREs, back in the 80s, when they were really terrible. Today’s MREs a much, much better tasting than those. And they have quite a bit more bulk and calories.

Let’s also not forget that some units that deployed early to Desert Storm, like the 82nd Airborne, also went a very long time on nothing but MREs.

The ideal is that troops get at least one hot meal, and preferably two, every day in a combat zone. It rarely works out that way. But the Army guidance is that troops should not subsist on MREs for more than 30 days.