A Twofer Tuesday with COL Mike Pietrucha

First up, an essay in USNI News on Offensive Aerial Mining, and using precision guided weapons as naval mines. In September of 2014 Pacific Command (PACOM) demonstrated the Quickstrike-ER, a modification of the 500-lb. Australian winged JDAM-ER. Dropped from a B-52H, this was the first-ever deployment of a precision, standoff aerial mine. Now a parallel…

First up, an essay in USNI News on Offensive Aerial Mining, and using precision guided weapons as naval mines.

In September of 2014 Pacific Command (PACOM) demonstrated the Quickstrike-ER, a modification of the 500-lb. Australian winged JDAM-ER. Dropped from a B-52H, this was the first-ever deployment of a precision, standoff aerial mine. Now a parallel Joint effort between PACOM, the Navy and the Air Force has had its first success in the form of a 2000-lb. Mk-64 Quickstrike-J laid by a B-52H. Dropped in two variants, the Quickstrike-J can be laid from any altitude, by any aircraft equipped to drop the GBU-31 JDAM. In the case of the bombers, an entire minefield can be laid in a single pass without even passing directly over the minefield. The mines come in two variants, the Mod 0 with the legacy Mk-57 TDD and the Mod 3 with the new Mk-71 TDD. Both variants are assembled entirely out of components already in the US inventory, making these weapons possible without a protracted acquisition process.

Next, a rather alarming look at the Air Force’s cuts post-Desert Storm, and the challenges they now present to penetrating defended airspace:

Desert Storm remains the benchmark for a modern air campaign. In 40 days, a diverse assembly of coalition airpower managed to shatter one of the world’s largest military establishments, paving the way for the mere 100 hours it took ground forces to eject the Iraqi military from Kuwait. The air campaign was preceded by the most effective defense suppression effort ever, dismantling the Iraqi air defense system in 72 hours. In the aftermath of this successful campaign, the Air Force doubled down on its commitment to electronic warfare, fielding replacements for the aging F-4G Wild Weasel and moving the mission systems from the EF-111A into a new airframe. The Wild Weasel school, scheduled for closure, was revitalized and staffed with a talented cadre possessing recent combat experience. By 1996, the Air Force had demonstrated that it recognized the reasons for its recent success and prepared itself for the advanced air defense developments sure to follow the unambiguously decisive use of airpower in the Gulf.

No it didn’t.

What really happened was that the Air Force dismantled a wildly successful “Electronic Combat triad,” consisting of the EF-111A, the F-4G, and the EC-130. The EF-111A Raven was an unarmed conversion of the F-111 fighter-bomber capable of jamming air defense radars. The F-4G Wild Weasel was the last of the Air Force Phantom conversions, intended to hunt down and kill radar-directed missile batteries and guns. And the EC-130 Compass Call was a powerful communications jammer. Not a single aircraft was lost to a radar threat in the Gulf War while an armed F-4G Wild Weasel or an EF-111 Raven was on station. F-4Gs alone fired a thousand anti-radiation missiles and took down over 250 radars, a hit rate unequaled before or since.

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Responses to “A Twofer Tuesday with COL Mike Pietrucha”

  1. McThag

    But but but…
    STEALTH!

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  2. Quartermaster

    USAF is stupidly putting all its eggs one basket. During the 50s they let the bomber generals decide what kind of fighters to build. It got a bunch of pilots killed over North Vietnam. We had some of the fastest fighters in the world, but they could get shot down fairly easily. Witness: the F-105
    Even with the F-4, USAF got a lot of pilots killed because they thought dogfighting skill wasn’t needed anymore. The navy learned and started TOPGUN. The USAF still seems not to have learned.
    Airpower is too important to leave to USAF generals.

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  3. McThag

    The USAF has always had problems with the designation system.
    Everything tactical got an F designation, strategic got a B.
    Thus the F-105, a tactical bomber, was F.
    It should have been redesignated to an A post-MacNamara if they were honest about using the system they developed.
    The Phantom was supposed to be a single mission fleet defense fighter that went out and shot down bombers trying to kill the carrier. The Crusader was supposed to handle the dogfighting. But then MacNamara happened.
    Obviously it’s a lot more complex than a short comment can express.

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