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Let’s take a brief look at the light infantry division of the late 1980s.

The light infantry division had just over 10,000 troops. It was designed to be very strategically mobile- the entire division and all its organic equipment could be moved by 500 C-141 sorties.

There was a small division headquarters, three infantry brigades each with three light infantry battalions, a division artillery headquarters with three 105mm artillery battalions and on 155mm arty battalion, a Cavalry squadron with two ground troops and two aviation troops, and various combat support and combat service support battalions such is Engineers, Military Intelligence, a Support and Transportation Battalion, and an aviation brigade with attack and assault helicopter battalions and a Chinook heavy lift company.

It was, while somewhat light on firepower, a balanced organization, and a reasonably well integrated combined arms. It was designed so that the division commander could, on the field of battle, emphasize the use of his combat support and combat service support troops to the brigade that made up the main effort.

The problem was, the division very rarely deployed. Like most divisions of the day, the three main maneuver brigades each cycled through a readiness cycle of training up, deployability, and recovery/support. And the brigades tended to be each in a different phase during these cycles. Further, deployments tended to not be division sized, but rather brigade sized.

Now, understand, when one of the infantry brigades did deploy, it didn’t go with just its three Infantry battalions. Infantry of course never goes without its supporting artillery battalion. And as a rule of thumb, they’d usually take a battery of 155mm along as well for counterbattery work. Nor could an infantry brigade sustain itself, so elements of the Division support command would have to deploy as well. And of course, part of the Engineer battalion would provide sapper support. And the Air Defense Artillery would provide a company to the support the brigade. The Aviation brigade would chop parts of the assault and attack helicopter battalions to provide fires and lift.  The Military Intelligence battalion would send a team to provide collection and analysis beyond the brigade S-2 capability.  The Signal battalion would send along a team to make sure the brigade could phone home. And the medical battalion would provide a treatment team for care above that of the Infantry battalions medical aid stations.

The training cycle in the Army is rather timeless. After a period of readiness and recovery, unit training begins with individual tasks. No matter how long you’ve been in the Army, you’ll be trained and tested on such skills as disassemble and reassemble the rifle, personal camouflage,  and individual movement techniques. Then the training moves to squad, then platoon, then company level tasks, such as attack, defense, and movement to contact. At the battalion level, the training shifts to combined arms, with support from artillery and the various other arms and services.  Those other arms and services tended to habitually assign the same elements of their commands to support the same battalions and brigades as in past training cycles. Hence the term “habitual relationship.” For instance, the MI battalion would have an element designed to support the division headquarters, but they’d also have a combined collection and EW/GSR company that teamed with each of the maneuver brigades. Alpha Company would tend to always support the 1st Brigade.

All these elements of divisional support chopped to support a brigade came to be known as the “divisional slice” as in they got their slice of the pie from higher headquarters.

By the late 1990s, when it was clear that the future would see far more brigade level deployments than division sized, it started to make some sense that the brigade commander should simply own those elements of the divisional slice. When the slice was under control at division level, the supported brigade commander had no control over the training of those elements that would eventually support him. For instance, the 105mm artillery battalion that would always end up supporting him reported to the DivArty commander, who might have significantly different views on the role of artillery in support of the Infantry. Which, well, that’s all well and good, but ultimately, the supported commander should have  a vote on the matter, don’t you think?

And so, at the turn of the century, the Army pulled the trigger, and shifted from division sized organization to a brigade level organization. Now, rather the being a headquarters with no troops permanently assigned (theoretically) as under the old Army of Excellence TO&E, each brigade would become a Brigade Combat Team, with  a fixed organization, and with the various supporting elements assigned as organic assets of the BCT. Two or three maneuver battalions, a cavalry squadron, an artillery battalion, engineers, Military Intelligence, and various odds and ends of the supporting arms would belong to the BCT commander. He would train them as he saw fit, and go forth knowing exactly what his supporting services would look like.

Mind you, the organization of the three main types of BCT (Armor, Stryker, Infantry) has been tinkered with almost from day one, but in general, the concept has held for over a decade now. And likely will for some time to come.

Interestingly, both the Russians and the Chinese have toyed with the idea of a shift to a brigade level organization, though there is evidence that the Russians are abandoning the brigade and shifting back to a divisional organization.