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A bit more on Guadalcanal

David McClure reached out about some of our previous posts on Guadalcanal, and since the comments close on old posts, left this in the contact tab: With just 3 effective carriers available in the theater Fletcher was tasked with protecting the fleet first. His reduced flight line, dwindling fuel supply and the effects of IJN…

David McClure reached out about some of our previous posts on Guadalcanal, and since the comments close on old posts, left this in the contact tab:

With just 3 effective carriers available in the theater Fletcher was tasked with protecting the fleet first. His reduced flight line, dwindling fuel supply and the effects of IJN attacks were also in consideration. Finally, his mental state must have been crucial as he watched the IJN become immediately hamstrung with the damage and loss of their carriers at Midway and Coral Sea. Still, the withdrawal and subsequent lack of support for weeks and months makes the Marine effort there all the more remarkable. In the end, after Ghormley was replaced and FDR made it a priority, the USN came through in their aggressive persuit of the naval battles in and around the island. There were enough mistakes to go around on Guadalcanal including Patch’s lack of aggression allowing 12,000 Japanese troops to escape in the most successful retreat of the Pacific War.

My father fought in the Pacific as a Marine Intelligence Officer and like every other vet I knew growing up, never, ever talked about it.

While researching Guadalcanal for a larger project, I found their story so compelling that it turned into “Nightmare Island”, a novel that follows two fictional Marines as they try to stay alive through the conflict. The historical details are as accurate as I could make them – they needed no embellishment.

You can find Nightmare Island on Amazon, and read the first six chapters for free. And if you do buy it, please remember that BTHBTS is an Amazon affilate, and if you go to Amazon via the link in the right sidebar, you’re supporting the blog through referral fees at no added expense to you.

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  1. ultimaratioregis

    No, sorry. Fletcher’s first task was to support the WATCHTOWER landings. If he didn’t think he could do so without undue risk to the carriers, he’d had plenty of opportunity to say so prior to 7 August. He had been told unequivocally by both Turner and Vandegrift that the transports would require 96 hours to unload. Presumably, he agreed to this in the many stages of planning and rehearsal leading up to the landings. When, on 8 August, he informed Turner and Vandegrift, both reacted the same way. They were furious, because they had been promised support.

    Instead, Fletcher beat a hasty retreat, forcing the now-naked transports to withdraw, with the vast preponderance of the Marines’ food and ammunition, and virtually all of its engineering equipment, plus the Division reserve 2nd Marines, still aboard. The idea that Nimitz concurred with Fletcher’s decision is a bit of revisionism. Nimitz relieved Fletcher, and Ghormley, who’d given permission for Fletcher’s abandoning of the landings, a few weeks later. The US was fortunate beyond belief that Hyukatake passed up 20 days of unimpeded opportunity to make a significant counterlanding.

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  2. Quartermaster

    Fletcher had already come under criticism for lack of aggression, and the withdrawal from Guadalcanal was the final straw for Nimitz.

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  3. Craig Swain

    Your premise is, as we well demonstrated on that active thread, based on a LOT of faulty assumptions and conjecture. History must have a foundation in fact. The simple fact of the matter, as McClure states, was Fletcher’s primary responsibility was to preserve the fleet carriers above anything else. The reality of the situation was that the Japanese were just as strained on resources as the allies. They could not have driven the Marines off the island given several months. Heck, the Army had stood on Bataan for three months with zero support, and at a time when the Japanese were not nearly as strained, resource-wise, as in the late summer of ’42. So this boils down to how much inconvenience the Marines were asked to shoulder for the strategic good.

    As for an exposed landing force on the beach, I’m reminded of the Airborne response there… “We’re airborne. We’re meant to be surrounded.” Sorta goes without saying there would be some adversity in the operation.

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  4. ultimaratioregis

    Craig, that is BS. Fletcher’s unilateral decision to provide less than the minimum support was unconscionable, and Nimitz knew it. Which is why Fletcher was gone. General Hyukatake was dismissive of the size of the landings, and of the fighting quality of the Americans. Therefore, he never conducted a proper reconnaissance, nor did he arrange for any counter-landings in any strength. By August of 1942, there were more than 25,000 garrisoning Bougainville, numbers that would eventually reach 40,000. The US had no capability to interdict in the slightest, had Hyukatake been aggressive in countering the US landings.
    I attended a lecture last week in which I discussed the matter with a historian of some note. He concurred completely that the means were there for the Japanese to counter WATCHTOWER, and he blamed Hyukatake’s arrogance and contempt for the Americans as being the main reason he did not.

    You didn’t “demonstrate” anything except a willingness to ignore the inconvenient facts and make some smart-ass comments with your hindsight glasses on about “adversity”. Fletcher was wrong. He should have been relieved. He was.

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