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Chief Pentagon Weapon Tester Dr. Michael Gilmore remains fundamentally dissatisfied with the survivability of the Navy’s littoral combatant ship (LCS) and its upgraded follow-on, the small surface combatant (SSC). In an emailed statement described in a January 8th Bloomberg article, Dr. Gilmore stated, “Notwithstanding reductions to its susceptibility” compared with the design of the first 32 ships, “the minor modifications to the LCS will not yield a ship that is significantly more survivable.” It remains to be seen, however, how the Navy can improve the other legs of the “survivability triangle” on a hull of 3000 tons displacement and less than 425 feet in length. Small ships have been historically unsurvivable. Modern small warships are not in any way the equivalent of the World War 2 predecessors. Every warship is a compromise in armament, endurance, speed, and survivability. This is especially true of the LCS, as its modular operational profile demands absolute adherence to weight limitations.

via The LCS and SSC Survivability Dilemma.

Rather obviously, small warships are not as survivable as larger warships.

Even worse, the LCS was never intended to be as survivable as previous combatants of similar size, and the upgrades to turn LCS into SSC will do little to ameliorate that fact.

One key difference between WWII small combatants and today’s smaller ships is that in WWII, it was understood that losing significant numbers of destroyers and other ships was simply the cost of doing business. Survivability measures were built in, significantly unit propulsion arrangements, very robust firefighting and dewatering equipment, and eventually extensive emergency electrical power distribution systems. Coupled with damage control training embedded throughout the ships company, these measures allowed many ships to continue to fight while damaged, or to retire from battle for later repair. The ships were not seen as disposable, but rather expendable. That is, reasonable measures were taken to make them as survivable as possible, but the recognition that losses would occur was always there.

Recent major combatant losses and damage are of a sort with previous experience. USS Stark was barely saved after being attacked by Iraqi Exocet missiles. While she was saved, she certainly was in no way capable of continuing her mission. Similarly, the USS Samuel B. Roberts was barely saved after striking a mine in the Persian Gulf. That she was saved at all is very much a testament to her crew. While her radars and missile launcher remained online, she was severely compromised in her ability to conduct her operations.

The USS Princeton, a somewhat larger vessel, was able to withstand the effects of two mines with considerable damage, though her Aegis weapon system was soon available.

The USS Tripoli (LPH-10) similarly struck a mine, but was able to remain on station. It was only fuel contamination for her embarked helicopters that prevented her from continuing operations. Within 30 days, she was able to resume operations. Size matters.

Interestingly, mines, that is, underwater weapons, which compromise the hull of a warship, in all three cases failed to sink their targets.

Contrast that with the British experience in the Falklands War, where bombs and missiles sank several major warships. The conventional thinking to some extent is that missile damage will render a ship a mission kill, but likely not sink it. The experience there suggests a lesson long ago learned- that is, that post impact fires are the greatest threat (see too the damage to Stark). Sheffield was gutted by fires, and the sinking of her hulk likely merely saved the Royal Navy from towing her all the way home only to be scrapped.

To return to the LCS, the concept of the ship was always that she would never be survivable in the face of a sophisticated threat. That’s not terribly shocking for a ship designed primarily as a mine countermeasure. But when you design a frigate sized ship while retiring your frigate fleet, and still facing frigate type missions, you’ll almost inevitably be forced to use LCS in those same missions, which the ship was not designed to survive.

That’s some sharp thinking there, Navy.