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I’m not much of a cruiser skipper, but GrumpWagon had a heck of an outing in the Tier VI Soviet cruiser, the Budyonny.

I make a guest appearance as a shell sponge.

A liberal friend on Facebook was decrying the right wing, and it occurred to me that some of her liberal friends might like to know why conservatives think the way we do, and as an example, I offered this regarding the recent controversial executive order on immigration.

Let’s talk about Trumps recent executive order halting visas from 7 majority Muslim nations.  First, does the US have an absolute right to control its own borders, and determine who, if anyone, may gain entry? Per common law, predating even our founding, that is not just a given, but a sine qua non, a definitional characteristic of a nation state.

Our Constitution has placed the power over immigration wholly into the hands of the Congress. Congress in turn has passed laws detailing such. Much of what they passed was legislation that left the actual decision making process in the hands of the President, so as to address changing priorities in a more timely manner.

So far, so good. Congress clearly has constitutional authority to pass immigration law. And delegating the specifics of the execution of that law to the Executive in Chief is also constitutional. In this case, the the relevant statute grants authority to the President to exclude persons or classes of persons deemed by the President, in his sole judgment, to be national security risks from entry into the US. And judicial precedent has long held that the right to refuse entry is pretty much absolute.

Of those 7 nations listed in the EO, six are failed states where it is effectively impossible to truly determine whether visa applicants are who they indeed say they are, or if they are or are not radicalized threats. The seventh nation has as its de facto national motto “Death to America.” Instituting a pause to review our vetting procedures in these cases is well within the scope of the statute the EO references as its authority to implement the pause.

Note, to this point, I’ve been discussing whether or not Trump’s EO is constitutional  and lawful. In my opinion, it is. Whether or not is is a good policy is another question. I tend to think it is, with some reservations. As to whether legal permanent residents (Green Card holders) can or should be subject to it is a bit more beyond my understanding. I’m not well informed on the jurisprudence on the matter. My understanding is that there is a tension in current law between “LPRs are different” and “still aliens, still can be denied.”

And springing it on a Friday night was probably pretty politically stupid. But stupid doesn’t amount to unconstitutional or illegal. And let’s not forget, for a large swath of the population who consider immigration an important political issue, and who feel their concerns have been ignored or ridiculed by both parties for three decades, any action is going to be something they will celebrate.  You can say they are backwards, or they are mistaken, or they lack compassion. Maybe, maybe not. What they don’t lack is numbers, and they were a large part of how Donald Trump wound up in the Oval Office.

Let’s move on to the so-called Monday Night Massacre of Acting Attorney General Sally Yates. Lawyers for some aliens denied entry (or held for additional screening) obtained preliminary injunctions against the EO in some very limited cases. Fair enough. That’s what courts are for.* Acting AG Yates, a holdover from the Obama administration who was asked to stay on until the next AG is confirmed, issued an order to the DoJ to not defend the EO in the courts. Here’s the problem with that. She did not make an argument that the EO is unconstitutional, or that no good faith defense of its legality could be mounted. If she believed that to be the case, she should have resigned. The AG, acting or otherwise, is the head of the Department of Justice. And the department heads of all executive departments only enjoys authority as derived from the executive authority held solely by the President. There is no inherent authority in the office Ms. Yates held. Not only was President Trump well within his authority to dismiss her, he was practically obligated to do so.

As to the supposed hypocrisy of the Right suddenly celebrating EOs after condemning them for 8 years of the Obama administration, well, here’s the thing. It’s not the fact that EOs were issued. It’s that so often the EOs issued by the Obama administration clearly went beyond the authority delegated by the underlying authorizing statute passed by Congress. President Obama’s EOs had a terrible track record in federal courts, with more unanimous rulings by the Supreme Court against his policies than  any other president.

So, from where I sit, I do not see the Constitution being trampled by an out of control executive. I see a president who is implementing policies that he promised, within the authority delegated to him by law. Again, whether those policies are wise or unwise, is, and forever will, be a matter of perspective.

*Though I could make a case that as the aliens have not been granted entry into the US (that is, until you clear immigration, you technically are not under the jurisdiction of the United States), they have no standing to sue in US courts.

The initial operations of B-29 Superfortress bombers of the 20th Air Force against Japan were, for a variety of reasons, not nearly as successful as the Army Air Forces had hoped. The stupendous costs poured into building the B-29 fleet were compared to the meager returns of strategic bombing of industrial targets, and the math was bad. For one thing, the jet stream over Japan (and the higher operating altitude of the B-29 compared to B-17 and B-24 types) meant bombing accuracy was somewhat appalling.

These poor results were a major factor in the well known switch from daytime precision bombing to night incendiary attacks that razed Tokyo and so many other cities in the last months of the war.

One other mission the B-29s undertook is virtually forgotten today, but had an impact far out of proportion to the effort expended.

That mission was Operation Starvation, the offensive aerial mining campaign against the Japanese home waters.

A simple glance at a map shows that as an island chain, Japan is critically dependent on sea traffic to move supplies, people, and commodities. Further, virtually all of Japan’s strategic industries were almost wholly dependent on commodities that had to be imported from either the islands of the South West Pacific or from the Asian mainland. From almost the first day of the war, the US Navy had instituted an effort to deny the Japanese the use of these sea lane, primarily through its submarine force.

At the urging of ADM King, GEN Hap Arnold agreed to devote a small percentage of 20th Air Force missions to aerial mining.

Beginning on March 27, 1945, B-29s of the 313th Bombardment Wing would eventually fly 1,529 sorties in 46 missions, and lay 12,135 mines. That accounted for just under 6% of 20th AF sorties. In return, postwar survey would reveal that the mines accounted for an astonishing 670 vessels sunk or damaged, with a tonnage of 1.25 million tons. Considering the Japanese merchant fleet was estimated to have only about 2 million tons available when the campaign began, this was a stunning return on investment.

Additionally, in addition to direct losses, the minefields effectively forced Japan to cease shipping to many ports, and through many  sealanes. Operation Starvation was aptly named. Japan was unable to feed itself from domestic crops alone, and by the end of the war, the mining, combined with the submarine force blockade, meant that food shortages in Japan were rapidly becoming critical. Whether such a blockade would have been enough to preclude the need for the atomic attacks has been hotly debated for years, but clearly offensive aerial mining was a potent weapon against those nations that relied on the sea for their survival.

All this at a cost of only 15 B-29s lost, less than a 1% loss rate.

The US would not forget the success of Operation Starvation. When the US began its involvement in the Vietnam War, virtually the first request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Johnson White House was to allow the aerial mining of Haiphong Harbor. President Johnson declined.

Eventually, in 1967, President Johnson would authorize the aerial mining of several rivers in North Vietnam, and on the night of February 26, 1967, for the first time since World War II, and for the first time ever by jet, the US delivered aerial mines that effectively shut down traffic on those rivers.

For a more detailed analysis of aerial mining in World War II,  and especially Operation Starvation, read the paper submitted below.

Operation Starvation by Arthur Barie on Scribd

A compilation of some of my best shots over the last couple weeks.

One of these days, I’ll be honest with you, and feature a far more typical outing, where I get blasted out of the water almost immediately.

THE PENTAGON — In news that has every sailor and Marine in the Department of the Navy literally wailing with inconsolable grief, President Trump recently announced the nomination of a former soldier to be the next Secretary of the Navy, thus officially replacing the “greatest naval hero of the last century,” Ray Mabus.

According to White House sources familiar with the decision, the president chose Philip Bilden, a former U.S. Army intelligence officer, for his myriad talents and abilities, though he lamented having to replace Mabus — a man universally beloved by the Navy and Marine Corps for being “a principled leader who never compromised his position to push his own political or social agendas,” Trump said.

via www.duffelblog.com

After a few desultory outings earlier in the day, Rusty and I went out one last time as a two ship division of Tier X US Battleships, the Montana.

Over at War on the Rocks, retired Air Force Colonel Mike Pietrucha takes a look at the history of light aircraft adapted for the low end of the spectrum for the attack mission:

There has been a recent flurry of press attention on OA-X, an Air Force effort to obtain off-the-shelf light attack aircraft.  Sen. McCain’s recent publication of Restoring American Power — which calls for the Air Force to acquire 300 light attack aircraft — will no doubt intensify interest in the idea, with many constituencies trying to define OA-X for their own benefit and profit.  Appearing to emerge out of the blue, the idea has garnered some degree of instant opposition, not all of it informed.  The OA-X is already well-defined. It is the result of an effort that started nine years ago in the height of the surge in Iraq and is regaining currency as a result of the expanding use of airpower to engage violent extremist organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere.  Like many good ideas, it has as its genesis another successful effort from the past. Contrary to popular opinion, the Department of Defense can be remarkably good at turning to successful historical examples.

In 1966, the Air Force found itself in a conundrum.  As the United States slid deeper into Southeast Asia, the Air Force’s stable of fighters was dominated by fast-moving fighters designed for high-intensity conflict with the Soviets, including an expected exchange of nuclear weapons.  Aircraft like the F-101 and F-105 were optimized for the nuclear strike role but not for conventional counterland missions.  Our true multirole fighter, the mighty Phantom II, was an adaptation of a Navy fleet defense fighter. The Tactical Fighter Experimental, a joint program forced on the U.S. Air Force and Navy by Secretary of Defense Robert S. MaNamara, was encountering problems in flight testing.  The Navy variant would be cancelled in 1968.  The Air Force was left without a modern attack capability and was forced to use a Korean-Vintage A-1 Skyraider that had been retired by the Navy.

Nine years. And not one squadron on the ramp.

What’s infuriating is that the Air Force could have been pushing on an open door in 2007 for funds to buy these planes. Essentially, the choice was between the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, and the Beechcraft AT-6C Texan II. The Boeing OV-10X restart was an outside possibility.

Seriously, while each platform had its strengths and weaknesses, any would have been an acceptable choice. Buying them in reasonable (300) numbers would have seen them begin to enter squadron service within three to four years. And having them in the inventory would lead to some nice side effects. One major benefit would be the reduced demand signal for fast jet attack aircraft such as the F-16 and F-15E Strike Eagle.  That would mean the flight hours they’re currently using to fly oval racetracks over Afghanistan could instead been husbanded for training, or used in higher threat environments, such as Libya or Syria. The lowered operational tempo of having a larger force would also very likely helped stem some of the bleeding of talent the Air Force is currently struggling with.

As an added bonus, Air Force adoption of such a system would also likely increase the prospects of friendly nations buying additional aircraft, and increasing interoperability.

One suspects the Air Force was concerned that adoption of a low cost solution to 80% of its problems would have had an adverse effect on the procurement of the F-35 Lightning. We think that is unlikely. What it would have done is removed some of the pressure to concurrently develop and build the jet, which has been the source of more than a few of the issues the Lightning has faced.

Most importantly, from where I sit, the failure of the services to adopt a low cost solution is simply another manifestation of a procurement system that is so sclerotic that it simply cannot provide the force with weapon systems in anything approaching a timely manner.

SAN ANTONIO — The Army will quietly deactivate its three long-range surveillance companies in the active-duty force in the remaining days of January, along with four National Guard companies in 2018, the Army said.

The nearly 100 soldiers in each of three active-duty companies attached to three Corps commands at Fort Hood in Texas, Fort Bragg in North Carolina and Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington will be reassigned to other units at those posts, said Lt. Col. Christina Kretchman, an Army spokeswoman.

Army National Guard units in Nebraska, Georgia, Indiana and Alabama will fold up their long-range surveillance companies and reassign those soldiers in August 2018, Kretchman said.

Stars and Stripes first reported in July that senior leaders decided to deactivate the companies through an evaluation in the Total Army Analysis, a force structure program used to balance the composition of the force with strategy and resources.

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Computer models were used to conclude long-range surveillance companies were not in demand by ground commanders.

Defense analysts have said Army commanders have an aversion to risk and a growing preference to use technology such as satellites and drones for reconnaissance rather than insert small teams of soldiers.

via www.stripes.com

Eh. I'm ambivalent. One the one hand, not many commanders are keen to put a six man team deep behind the lines unless it's a Special Forces team. Seems like something of a duplication of effort.

One the other hand, it's a capability we might genuinely need at some point in the future. Maybe keep one company just to keep the tribal knowledge handy.