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Bastogne, as you’ve never seen it before.
Even the most casual of historians know that the sleepy little village of Bastogne became the center of attention during the Battle of the Bulge in December of 1944.
The First Division Museum in Catigny has an exhibit commemorating the battle opening tomorrow. In Lego!
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Hagel out at DoD
So, word is current Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has submitted his resignation. Further, the rumor is he was pushed to resign.
Hagel doesn’t have much of a reputation as a bright light. Indeed, he’s really known as rather a dim bulb. One thing about the Obama administration. It’s incredibly partisan. And yet, it’s had a Republican as SecDef the whole time. That’s rather obviously an attempt to deflect criticism. The problem is, like so many other cabinet positions, it’s been neutered by the Obama inner circle and its “czars” and incredibly tight inner circle, which is basically Obama, Mrs. Obama, and Valerie Jarrett.
Rumored replacements for Hagel include Michele Flournoy or Ashton Carter.
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SECDEF Fired: Hagel Goes Under the Bus
Big news this morning that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has been fired by President Obama. Big news, but not surprising. Hagel has openly contradicted the President several times, especially regarding the Administration’s rather childish assertions regarding the necessity of ground forces in the fight against ISIS. You will hear various stories about how this was Hagel’s idea, and of course, the media will dutifully report as fact the White House’s version of events. But that version will be as accurate and honest as WH proclamations on Benghazi, the IRS, Fast and Furious, ISIS intelligence failures, etc.
Though Hagel was not known as a deep thinker, the idea that he somehow couldn’t grasp the deeper and more complex defense issues smells like the intellectual elitism of the self-proclaimed far-left “ruling” class. It is far more likely that Hagel attempted to keep Obama and his National Security Council grounded in reality, only to be poo-pooed and brushed aside by the overwhelming cacophony from the Marxist ideologues that have the President’s ample ears. I was never a big Chuck Hagel fan, as he was a Global Zero guy whose viewpoints at various times bordered on the curious, but as SECDEF I thought he was one of the few at the top of the Defense structure with the spine to stand up to the rampant amateurish stupidity that emanated from 1600 Pennsylvania. We could have done far worse. We certainly might going forward.
Whether talks were “initiated” by Hagel or not, the nature of those talks were probably discussions about whether Obama was going to keep tossing aside wise counsel or not in favor of the childlike and naive rantings of his fellow-travelers. And, the answer today seems to be a resounding YES. Obama will continue to march forward in secular progressive lockstep to the Internationale, wreaking the concomitant damage on US security, foreign relations, and national power.
Funny that the Secretary of Defense that HE chose, to replace another that had had enough (Panetta), is now thought not to be up to the job. One has to wonder who is. Michele Flournoy has been mentioned, along with Ash Carter. One has to think Bob Work is in the mix. All are far too talented to want to serve out the last two years of the military train wreck that is the Defense Department under Obama. It is like being hired to coach the Washington Generals, and being told you are expected to win.
Afghanistan, Air Force, army, Around the web, budget, Defense, guns, history, iraq, islam, marines, navy, nuclear weapons, obama, Politics, Syria, Uncategorized, veterans, war -
Load HEAT- Alana De La Garza
I mostly remember her from her recurring role on CSI:Miami, but she spent quite some time on one of the Law and Order series.
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Dayum!
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Bryan Clark, Sea Control and Power Projection- The Future Surface Navy
On November 10, Bryan Clark, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, gave a presentation advocating changes in the structure and employment of the surface combatants in the US Navy. It’s a rather radical concept in some ways. In others, it’s simply a return to the traditional role of the Navy.
There are two fundamental roles for any navy, sea control and power projection. Sea control is ensuring that your fleet and merchant marine have the freedom to use the seas. Very generally, sea control is war against the enemy navy. Power projection is use of your navy to attack enemy forces and assets ashore. Our own US Navy, in terms of World War II, served in both roles. The Battle of the Atlantic, the epic struggle against the U-Boats, was largely a sea control battle. In the Pacific, the island hopping campaign saw the Navy in a power projection role. Of course, both theaters were not exclusively one other the other type of naval mission. You have to exercise sea control to be able to project power. And often the best way to exercise sea control is by projecting power ashore, to defeat the enemy’s base.
Clark is an interesting fellow to address the issue. In his naval career, he was a nuclear submariner. But he’s also been working as a strategic level thinker for years, and before joining the CBSA, served as a special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations. His focus there was at the operational and tactical level. His presentation is about 40 minutes long.
There are also two other videos, the introduction, and the Q&A session.
If you don’t wish to spend 40 minutes watching the video, Breaking Defense has a thought provoking article on Clark’s ideas, and some of the challenges.
Someone shoots a cruise missile at you. How far away would you like to stop it: over 200 miles out or less than 35?
If you answered “over 200,” congratulations, you’re thinking like the US Navy, which has spent billions of dollars over decades to develop ever more sophisticated anti-missile defenses. According to Bryan Clark, until 12 months ago a top advisor to the nation’s top admiral, you and the Navy are wrong.
Now for my thoughts on the matter.
Let’s take a look at how we came to have the surface combatant fleet we have today. Currently, the Navy has 22 Tico cruisers, 62 Burke destroyers, 28 or so Perry frigates, and a couple of LCS. The Ticos and Burkes were conceived primarily as anti-air warfare escorts for the carrier battle groups. The Perry’s were seen as anti-sub escorts for merchant, logistics, and amphibious groups. The LCS are… well, that’s been covered elsewhere.
Prior to World War II, the cruisers and destroyers of the fleet were seen both as a screen for the main line of battleships, and as an offensive weapon to attrit any enemy screen of their own line of battle, and as weapons to attack that same line of battle. The carriers of the fleet were seen as an adjunct of the screen, primarily to provide reconnaissance and scouting, and to provide air defense over the fleet.
But by the end of the war, the air wing of the carrier was seen as the primary weapon of the fleet, both as an anti-surface warfare weapon, and for power projection ashore. It was also seen as the primary defensive weapon of the fleet. The cruisers and destroyers were no longer seen as offensive weapons, but rather as distributed sensors for the fleet, networking to provide that information to the air wing, and serving as backstops against any leakers that the air wing failed to destroy.
That focus on anti-air escort has remained with the surface combatant community to this day. To be sure, it is not the sole mission of cruisers and destroyers, but it is the driving force behind the design and construction of almost every major surface combatant class since World War II. The only other mission which the surface navy placed nearly as much emphasis was anti-submarine warfare. And with the collapse of the Soviet Union, that emphasis has largely been allowed to lapse. See the shedding of the entire fleet of Spruance destroyers, long before their useful service lives were over.
One of the main characteristics of the evolution of the fleet air defense escort has been the ever increasing range of the interceptors they employ. Radar range has effectively had roughly the same range since its introduction. The first interceptor used by the Navy, the Terrier missile, had an effective range of about 10-15 miles. Today, the SM-6 can theoretically engage at ranges of up to 150 miles.
Clark argues that the long range interceptor is a losing proposition, in that the SM-6 costs more than any missile it is likely to engage. Further, it’s likely that any near peer enemy can launch enough cruise missiles to simply empty the magazine of any cruiser or destroyer. That is, if a cruiser carries 50 interceptors, the enemy only need launch 51 cruise missiles. Instead, he argues, the Navy should abandon the long range interceptor, and focus on short range interception, at about 35 miles, which means using the RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). Where a Vertical Launch System (VLS) cell can only carry one SM-6, that same cell can carry four ESSM. Coupled with jamming and decoying, and with emerging laser and rail gun technologies, Clark argues that this defense would allow for sufficient magazine space to counter any likely attack, while also leaving sufficient cells for offensive weapons to destroy the launch platforms of the enemy. And he’s certainly correct that it is more effective to destroy the launch platform than to attempt to intercept every possible incoming attack.
But that revision to the missile defense doctrine ignores that any potential adversary with sufficient numbers of cruise missiles to overwhelm a cruiser or destroyer is an adversary that would be worthy of engaging with a carrier strike group. And thus we’re back to the point where the air wing is the primary offensive weapon, tasked to destroy the launch platform. Kill the archer, not the arrows, as the saying goes. And with the air wing as the primary offensive weapon, that logically means the surface combatants are back to their historical role of defending the carrier. As to the cost argument, yes, an SM-6 does cost more than any single cruise missile it will likely engage. But that’s not the fiscal argument that matters. The real cost argument is, how much is saved by spending $4 million expending an SM-6? If it keeps a $15 billion dollar aircraft carrier from suffering a couple billion dollars in damage, that’s money well spent.
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F-15E Low Level in the Cascades
The two seat F-15E Strike Eagle (or Beagle as its often nicknamed) is the replacement for the F-111. The original F-15 design mantra was “not a pound for air to ground.” That is, the F-15 was to be a single purpose weapon, focusing solely on being the best air-to-air fighter in the world.
Ironically, many of the characteristics that made it such a successful air to air fighter would lend themselves to making the Strike Eagle a highly successful bomber. Good thrust to weight ratio, huge internal fuel capacity, excellent load capacity and structural strength, combined with modernized radar, special electro-optical sensors, and with reconfigured weapons racks make the F-15 one of the most potent tactical strike aircraft around.
This jet from the 366th Fighter Wing stationed at Mountain Home AFB in Idaho shows us the fun part of the job, flying through the VR-1335 low level route in the beautiful Cascade Mountains.
I’ve never seen the Strike Eagles doing this, but I did occasionally see F-111s and A-6s zipping through the mountains. It’s a heck of a sight.
If you prefer the unedited version with no music, click here.
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The VAQ Squadrons
The fielding of the EA-6B Prowler tactical jammer aircraft in 1970 brought about some significant changes to doctrine and organization in carrier air wings. Previously, electronic warfare was something of an odd duck in the air wing. Typically at that time, an air wing would have two squadrons of fighters, two of light attack, a medium attack squadron, and an airborne early warning squadron. The wing would also host some detachments of odds and ends, such as a couple of A-3 variants as electronic warfare support and tanker, a helo detachment for plane guard and utility use, and maybe a couple of reconnaissance planes.
The sophisticated Prowler, combined with the Navy’s growing recognition of the value of both standoff and escort jamming in the face of the North Vietnamese air defenses, led the Navy to organize Prowlers in squadrons of four aircraft. Each Prowler seats a crew of four, and as a planning factor, a squadron generally has 1.5 crews per plane, or roughly 24 flight crew. Of the Prowler crew, only one is an aviator. The other three were Naval Flight Officers known as ECMOs or Electronic CounterMeasures Officers. The Prowler community was one of the first where the NFO community was arguably more important than the aviators. After all, anyone could drive the bus, but the skills of the ECMOs were quite specialized. At any rate, with only four planes, a Prowler squadron would have more aircrew than a light attack squadron with 12 planes. These Prowler squadrons would be designated Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons (or TACELRONS) with the designator VAQ. For instance, the Fleet Replacement Squadron is VAQ-129.
It took several years for the Prowler to fully enter the fleet. While deployed aboard a carrier, a Prowler squadron would report to the commander of that carrier’s air wing. When in home port, the squadron reported to the Commander, Medium Attack/Tactical Electronic Warfare Wing, Pacific Fleet (or COMMATVAQWINGPAC) at NAS Whidbey Island, WA, where all the Navy’s active Prowler squadrons were based.
As the 70s and 80s wore on, the size of Naval Aviation varied somewhat, and so to did the size of the Prowler fleet. The Reagan era build up saw an expansion in the number of air wings, and so to the number of Prowler squadrons.
Concurrently, the Air Force, seeing the same challenges in a future air defense environment, looked to leave behind its legacy fleet of EB-57 and EB-66 stand off jammers, and integrate a modern, supersonic escort jammer. And so in the early 1970s, began a program to modify some early production F-111A Aardvarks to carry a version of the Prowler’s ALQ-99 jammer system.
Entering into service in 1983, a total of 42 were delivered to the Air Force by 1985, serving in five different squadrons. Officially nicknamed the Raven, the EF-111A was almost universally known instead as the Spark ‘Vark. The Spark ‘Vark served admirably, particularly in Desert Storm, providing the same jamming support Naval Aviation had come to count upon.
But soon after Desert Storm, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent so-called “peace dividend” drawdown, the Air Force made the decision to retire its F-111 fleet. And with that fleet gone, it was only a matter of time before supporting the EF-111A became prohibitively expensive.
Rather than spending the time and money to develop a replacement aircraft, the Air Force simply threw up its hands and said “we quit.” The Air Force simply forfeited what by now was known as the Electronic Attack mission.
But that didn’t mean the Air Force didn’t recognize the need for a dedicated Electronic Attack platform. Instead, it recognized that fielding its own platform was duplicative of costs. There was a perfectly good platform already in the Prowler. And in keeping with the Air Force ethos of central airpower management, the Air Force also didn’t see any reason why the Air Force should buy a platform already in service, duplicating the logistical tail involved.
Instead, the Air Force just decided the Navy would provide all its Electronic Attack assets in any future air campaign.
Now, the Navy didn’t really object to this. The only issues would be money for airframes and maintenance, and manpower to support such campaigns. After all, the Navy barely had enough Prowlers and crews to support its deploying carrier air wings. And there was no guarantee that a carrier air wing would be available to support any notional Air Force air campaign.
The Marines, operating their own Prowlers, quickly informed any and all that they were quite busy supporting Marine Air Wings and had no great desire to add any additional taskings, than you very much.
And so an odd hybrid series VAQ squadron was born. The Navy would buy extra Prowlers, and stand up the squadrons. The Air Force would not complain about Navy requests for funding for procurement and operations. Further, the Air Force would supply about half the personnel for the squadrons.
Known as Expeditionary squadrons, these VAQs would forego some of the training that traditional Navy VAQs went to, such as carrier qualification. Instead, these squadrons would be available to support taskings to a Combatant Command Air Component Commander.
With the retirement of the medium attack community COMMATVAQWINGPAC eventually evolved into Commander Electronic Attack Wing Pacific or COMVAQWINGPAC (oddly, as there’s no counterpart on the Atlantic side. COMVAQWINGPAC supports air wings in both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, as well as all of what are now known as Joint Expeditionary Squadrons).
All the VAQ squadrons, both fleet and Joint Expeditionary, have either transitioned from the Prowler to the EA-18G Growler, or will shortly. In addition to the “schoolhouse” squadron, VAQ-129, VAQ-130 through VAQ-142 are currently stationed at NAS Whidbey. Additionally, VAQ-209, a Reserve squadron, is stationed at Whidbey. Three squadrons are currently Joint Expeditionary. Two new squadrons, VAQ-143 and VAQ-144 are expected to be established in the next couple years, and both with be Joint Expeditionary.
There’s one other interesting squadron at NAS Whidbey. Housing quite a few Air Force personnel at a Navy base is a tad unusual for those Airmen. There are quite a few things the Navy and the Air Force do differently. Where the rubber meets the road, most of the time, the integrated squadrons work well. But for certain personnel management issues, the Air Force needs its own on sight leadership. And so, to act as the parent command for Air Force personnel at Whidbey, the 390th Electronic Combat Squadron is stationed at NAS Whidbey. It’s not an operational squadron, and doesn’t own any planes. It serves instead as “ownership’’ of all the Air Force personnel.
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Not Your "Father's Aegis"
The U.S. Navy’s first Aegis-equipped surface warship, the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47), joined the Fleet in January 1983, and all-but dared the Soviet Navy to take its best anti-ship cruise-missile shot.
The Navy’s newest Aegis guided-missile destroyer in the fall 2014, the USS Michael Murphy (DDG-112), was commissioned in December 2012. Murphy is the Navy’s 102nd Aegis warship. Another 10 Aegis DDGs are under construction, under contract or planned––a remarkable achievement!
Aegis surface warships were conceived during the height of the Cold War to defend U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups from massed Soviet aircraft and anti-ship cruise missile attacks. With the early retirements/layups of as many as 16 of 27 Aegis cruisers (beginning with Ticonderoga’s decommissioning in September 2004), some observers characterize the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) as an old, legacy program, whose time has passed.
via Not Your “Father’s Aegis”.
The poster child for a successful procurement program, Aegis shows what tight programatic controls coupled with good engineering and a realistic objective can achieve. By beginning with a fundamentally sound foundation, the edifice that is the Aegis program can continue to build to greater heights.
Incremental improvements in hardware, software, and networking have steadily increased the capability of the Aegis system. And all this is possible because of the sound choices RADM Meyer made at the very beginning. A clear vision of the threat lead to a clear vision of the needed capability. A clear vision of the need, combined with a clear vision of the state of the art led to a program that has endured, and served well.
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The PJ Tatler » Bombshell: Email Proves that White House, DOJ Targeted Reporter Sharyl Attkisson
One of the documents provides smoking gun proof that the Obama White House and the Eric Holder Justice Department colluded to get CBS News to block reporter Sharyl Attkisson. Attkisson was one of the few mainstream media reporters who paid any attention to the deadly gun-running scandal.
In an email dated October 4, 2011, Attorney General Holder’s top press aide, Tracy Schmaler, called Attkisson “out of control.” Schmaler told White House Deputy Press Secretary Eric Schultz that he intended to call CBS news anchor Bob Schieffer to get the network to stop Attkisson.
Schultz replied, “Good. Her piece was really bad for the AG.”
via The PJ Tatler » Bombshell: Email Proves that White House, DOJ Targeted Reporter Sharyl Attkisson.
That the Obama administration is lawless and thuggish is no news. But do note, Schmaler had reason to believe that CBS anchor Bob Schieffer was sufficiently in bed with the administration that DoJ could count on him to quash Attkisson, not because her reporting was wrong, but because it was unhelpful.
As Insty says, Job #2 is making sure you know what they want you to know. Job #1 is making sure you don’t know what they don’t want you to know.
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