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The River Monitor Parnaiba
In our post on the C-1A Trader yesterday we discussed the Brazilian Navy’s aircraft carrier Sao Paulo. Any navy with an operational aircraft carrier can usually be expected to have at least a decent blue water force. And Brazil does indeed have a respectable surface fleet. But what we sometimes forget is that, because of the Amazon River, Brazil also has a robust riverine force, with quite a few ships designed specifically for operations on the Amazon.
One such ship is the river monitor Parnaiba. The distinguishing characteristics of a monitor are pretty much unchanged since the first monitor was built by John Ericsson. A low freeboard and broad beam, coupled with a shallow draft, provides a stable a platform for guns.

The Brazilian Navy not only performs the traditional naval functions, but also fulfills those roles that in the United States would fall to the Coast Guard.
The Parnaiba was laid down in 1936, and commissioned and placed in active service in 1938. As far as I know, that makes her the oldest warship in active service.*

Parnaiba underwent a major overhaul from 1998 to 1999 that saw her reciprocating steam plant replaced with diesel engines, and added the helicopter flight deck aft. She’s armed with a single 3”/50 gun forward, two 40mm/70 guns amidships, and two 20mm guns on the fantail. She also carries two 81mm mortars.

We’ve talked about the 3”/50 gun before. Here’s a clip showing the Parnaiba doing some gunnery practice with it.
Brazil’s navy seems to have a somewhat less pompous choice in music when departing or returning to port than our own. And I have no idea what’s going one with Mr. Tacticool with the rifle.
Brazil isn’t the only country to use monitors on rivers. The Austro-Hungarian Empire used large monitors on the Danube, and Romania actually operates several modern monitors such as the Mihail Kogălniceanu class.

*USS Constitution, and HMS Victory, while both still in commission, cannot be said to be on active service.
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Afghani Armor
Spill pointed this out to me last night. The Afghani National Army has a tank battalion. Where did they get the tanks? They’re leftovers from the Russian invasion. The T-55 and the T-62 are archaic and obsolete compared to US armor. But facing an enemy lacking modern anti-tank weapons, they do bring considerable firepower to bear. When they can manage to get them running.
Here at the 111th Division’s base, the Afghan National Army’s lone tank battalion has about 44 T-55 and T-62 tanks that are in some kind of working order. About 20 to 25 can actually be started and used at any one time. In early July at least eight tanks were deployed against Taliban forces in nearby Kapisa province, officials said.
“These tanks are useful for the terrain of Afghanistan because Afghanistan is mostly a mountainous country,” said Col. Ali Reza, commander of the division’s quick-reaction force. “And if the enemy is stationed in the higher areas, these tanks are quite useful to eliminate them.”
The T-55, first introduced in the early 1950s, was a mainstay of Warsaw Pact forces through much of the Cold War. Its simplicity, reliability and powerful 100 mm gun also made it popular with Third World armies that found it difficult to maintain and operate more sophisticated machines. The T-62, a development of the T-55 with a smoothbore 115 mm gun, followed in the 1960s.
We’ve driven the Type 69 tank, an even more austere version of the T-55 built by China and operated by the Iraqi Army during Desert Storm. We would not like to have to fight from one.
As the article notes, there simply is no supply of spare parts, nor even ammunition, flowing into the country. The have to scavenge and scrounge for parts. And while there are hundreds of derelict tanks in the country, that’s still a finite source of parts. Getting half of the battalion’s 44 tanks up and running is quite the respectable accomplishment.
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The Humble Trader keeps on CODdin’
Carrier Onboard Delivery, that is, the use of planes to provide logistical support to aircraft carriers, has been around pretty much as long as there have been carriers. The first dedicated COD aircraft was the TBM-3R, a modified Grumman Avenger with its armament removed, bomb bay sealed, and provisions for carrying passengers, mail, and cargo. But by the early 1950s, the Avenger CODs were getting old and tired, and their limited payload and range was also an issue. So Grumman devised a COD version of their highly successful S2F Tracker airplane. The wings, engine and empennage were the same, but the fuselage was somewhat deeper, looking for all the world like a pregnant Tracker. Originally designated TF-1, it was named the Trader, and first flew in 1955. Eighty-three were built, and would support the fleet until 1984. It was the last radial engine powered plane in the fleet.

C-1A Trader
In the mid 1960s, Grumman would similarly adapt their E-2 Hawkeye wing, engine and empennage to a new, larger fuselage to produce the C-2 Greyhound COD, which first complemented, and later replaced the Trader in service. The Greyhound continues to support the COD mission to this day.
C-2A Greyhound
Now a 60 year old design, out of service for over thirty years, you’d think the Trader’s story has come to a close. But wait, there’s more!
When France retired its aircraft carrier Foch in favor of the nuclear carrier Charles De Gaulle, Brazil bought Foch to replace its previous aircraft carrier, Minas Gerais*, and renamed her Sao Paulo. The Brazilians also bought Kuwait’s surplus A-4KU Skyhawks. Designated AF-1 in Brazilian service, these are excellent carrier aircraft, but they lack range.
Back in 2010, Brazil announced plans to purchase four C-1A Traders, and refurbish them for use as COD aircraft. The planes are in very rough shape.

Basically, the framework and sheetmetal are to be saved, and everything else, the engines, hydraulics, wiring, instruments and avionics will be brought up to 21st century standards. As an aside, re-engining S-2 Trackers with turboprop engines is a fairly standard modification, one that even CalFires has done with its S-2T tanker fleet.
The program has been somewhat stalled for the last four years, but finally, this week, Brazil signed a contract with Elbit Systems of America to perform the work. In addition to restoring them to flight and modernizing them, Elbit will add a refueling package to enable the Traders to refuel the Navy’s Skyhawks.
Elbit Systems of America, LLC, a subsidiary of Elbit Systems Ltd., announced today that it received a directed subcontract from the Brazilian Navy to upgrade four Grumman C-1A aircraft. The prime contract is held by Marsh Aviation Company of Mesa, Arizona. The subcontract, valued at $106 million, will be performed by Elbit Systems of America over a five-year period.
The upgrade work will be performed in San Antonio, Texas, at the facilities of M7 Aerospace, an Elbit Systems of America subsidiary, under the supervision of Brazilian Navy officers who are currently deployed to San Antonio. When upgraded, the Grumman C-1A aircraft will be designated as KC-2 COD/AAR (Carrier Onboard Delivery/Air-to-Air Refueling) aircraft, for the ultimate use on the Brazilian Navy’s aircraft carrier, the NAe São Paulo. AEL Sistemas S.A., Elbit Systems’ Brazilian subsidiary, located in Porto Alegre, Brazil, will provide in-country contractor logistic support services for the program as a subcontractor to Elbit Systems of America.
The planes should start being delivered about 2018. It’s amazing just how much Grumman got right with their design. Sixty years old, and it makes more sense to refurbish these planes than to attempt to convert some other or to design a new one for the role.
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A little more on Offensive Surface Warfare
LT Rusty raised a valid point in the comments on our earlier post.
Only one minor quibble here – Flt IIA Burkes didn’t give up the Harpoon launchers to get the helo hangar. The launchers on a Burke are located at the midships QD, between the fore and aft superstructures, where they would not interfere in any way with the addition of the hangar. The IIA’s also – or at least the early ones – were still wired for Harpoon, and even have the brackets in CIC to install the console. It would be a matter of an afternoon’s work to put Harpoon back onboard.
The reason that it was left off is because the Navy doesn’t (or at least didn’t in 1999-2000) want a BVR SUW capability. The stated reason for this back then was that, based on rules of engagement, we needed to have VID on all tracks before shooting at them in anything other than a RED / FREE environment, and since we were never going to get an ROE like that, what was the point of buying the launchers and the birds for it?
That’s the real challenge in long range missile engagements- targeting.
You’re familiar with the Tomahawk cruise missile, which has been the favored weapon for first day strikes on enemy shore based assets. Originally there were three variants of the Tomahawk. The land attack missile in use today, a nuclear armed land attack variant, and a anti-ship version armed with a 1000 lb warhead.
The Tomahawk Anti Ship Missile, or TASM, used the active radar seeker of a Harpoon missile coupled with recycled 1000lb Bullpup missile warheads. It had a range of about 250 miles.
The radar aboard a ship such as a Burke simply cannot detect a target at that range. Passive sensors, such as Classic Outboard, can, but only with somewhat limited accuracy. The other option for targeting is using offboard sensors, such as the ship’s MH-60 helicopter, P-3 or P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft, or any other ships that the shooter is datalinked with.
Further, the TASM flies at a fairly sedate 500 knots or so. That means about a half hour time of flight out to maximum range. The seeker head of a TASM has a limited range. Coupled with aimpoint errors at launch, the target might well be outside the seekers field of view when it reaches the target area. The TASM can conduct a search pattern, however. But the risk is that the missile will acquire and attack neutral third party shipping. Blowing up allied or neutral ships is frowned upon.
While the Harpoon has a shorter range (and smaller warhead) than the TASM, many of the same challenges to Over The Horizon (OTH) targeting still apply.
Many modern anti-ship missiles address these challenges through mid-course update. That is, they send updated targeting information to the missile after it has been launched. Any future US Navy long range anti ship missile will definitely have this capability.
What’s interesting about LT Rusty’s mention of the Navy’s assumption that a Visual ID is required before shooting is that it is completely reversed from the assumptions behind the entire architecture of the surface fleet’s assumptions for anti-air warfare. The entire Aegis/Standard Missile program is designed for long range engagements of targets, long, long before any visual ID can be made.
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Penn Cove Killer Whales
Growing up on Whidbey Island was fantastic. You’ve probably seen Penn Cove, and not realized it. It’s been featured in a number of movies.
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A little old school Prowler moto video
Reader Alan kindly sent along a nice video of the EA-6B Prowler in action.
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The Problem With Attribution of Cyber Attacks
…is that it is all but impossible. A skillful black hat can easily lead investigators down paths they want them to take, while obscuring the true origins of a network breach. Mimicking attack vectors, using code associated with known hacking entities, even using language in the coding that points to known entities or countries, are common methods employed by those who wish to leave a false trail as to the origin of network attacks or exploits. (Of course, the most dangerous of that lot can hide for months or years the fact that there has been any network exploit at all.)
There was much discussion in the office this week about the FBI’s announcement that they had what amounts to definitive proof that the DPRK had perpetrated the now-famous hacking of Sony Pictures. I was definitely in a minority with my skepticism, for two reasons. The first is that I have a very hard time believing anything coming out of a Federal agency in this Administration. The Department of Justice, the IRS, the EPA, The State Department, Homeland Security, have all promulgated bald-faced lies to the American people, largely to cover up criminal and unconstitutional activity and/or the incompetence of those in charge. The second is the rather unrealistic understanding the Federal Government (and DoD in particular) has of how the Internet works. They THINK they know. But they don’t.
Apparently, I am not alone in my skepticism. From the Daily Beast:
So, malware found in the course of investigating the Sony hack bears “strong” similarities to malware found in other attacks attributed to North Korea.
This may be the case—but it is not remotely plausible evidence that this attack was therefore orchestrated by North Korea.
The FBI is likely referring to two pieces of malware in particular, Shamoon, which targeted companies in the oil and energy sectors and was discovered in August 2012, and DarkSeoul, which on June 25, 2013, hit South Korea (it was the 63rd anniversary of the start of the Korean War).
Even if these prior attacks were co-ordinated by North Korea—and plenty of security experts including me doubt that—the fact that the same piece of malware appeared in the Sony hack is far from being convincing evidence that the same hackers were responsible. The source code for the original “Shamoon” malware is widely known to have leaked. Just because two pieces of malware share a common ancestry, it obviously does not mean they share a common operator. Increasingly, criminals actually lease their malware from a group that guarantees their malware against detection. Banking malware and certain “crimeware” kits have been using this model for years.
So the first bit of evidence is weak.
But the second bit of evidence given by the FBI is even more flimsy:
“The FBI also observed significant overlap between the infrastructure used in this attack and other malicious cyber activity the U.S. government has previously linked directly to North Korea. For example, the FBI discovered that several Internet protocol (IP) addresses associated with known North Korean infrastructure communicated with IP addresses that were hardcoded into the data deletion malware used in this attack.”
What they are saying is that the Internet addresses found after the Sony Picture attack are “known” addresses that had previously been used by North Korea in other cyberattacks.
To cyber security experts, the naivety of this statement beggars belief. Note to the FBI: Just because a system with a particular IP address was used for cybercrime doesn’t mean that from now on every time you see that IP address you can link it to cybercrime. Plus, while sometimes IPs can be “permanent”, at other times IPs last just a few seconds.
Now, the FBI’s conclusions may be correct, and the DPRK may be officially or unofficially behind the breach. But TDB raises some important points. The DPRK can claim that a skilled hacker can make the evidence point back to them with little effort. And indeed this is a correct assessment. Why the Administration’s jump to blame the DPRK? Perhaps, as the article states, it is yet another example of amplifying and manipulating an event (a good crisis not going to waste?) as justification for yet more government control via draconian regulation.
Blaming North Korea offers an easy way out for the many, many people who allowed this debacle to happen; from Sony Pictures management through to the security team that were defending Sony Picture’s network.
You don’t need to be a conspiracy theorist to see that blaming North Korea is quite convenient for the FBI and the current U.S. administration. It’s the perfect excuse to push through whatever new, strong, cyber-laws they feel are appropriate, safe in the knowledge that an outraged public is fairly likely to support them.
I will be writing more about so-called “Net Neutrality” in the near future. But be certain that the regulations proposed by the Obama Administration have little to do with true net neutrality (despite the rather infantile assertions of some) and much more to do with expanding the regulatory power of the Federal Government over the content of the internet. With the mainstream news media either firmly behind the Far Left, or beholden to them for reasons other than intellectual agreement, trust in the Big News outlets is at an all-time low. It is on the internet where the fabrications of both the Obama Administration and its lap-dog agents in the press are torn apart by people with facts and experience, and people like Holder and Hillary and entities like the NYT and MSNBC are shown to be liars. So the assertion in the above citation is certainly plausible. To some of us, it is at least as plausible as the FBI’s proclamations of incontrovertible evidence of North Korea’s guilt in the Sony breach.
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P-8A Poseidon in the Offensive Surface Warfare Role
Over at CIMSEC, there is a nice piece suggesting that the P-8A Poseidon needs to have the LRASM integrated quickly to boost its ability to conduct offensive Surface Warfare, that is, shooting enemy ships.
Recent months have found uniformed officers and naval strategists writing and speaking about regaining the ability of U.S. Navy (USN) ships to conduct offensive anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The discussion has been lively and featured many authors and many different approaches. Some solutions are incremental, such as fielding more capable long-range weapons in existing launch systems.[i] Others are more radical, such as trading large long-range missile defense interceptors for small point defense missiles and building a new generation of multi-role cruise missiles.[ii]

As Lieutenant Glynn notes, the Poseidon is currently armed with the aged and obsolescent AGM-84 Harpoon.
Of course, the problem isn’t simply that the P-8 program doesn’t currently have a plan to integrate the Long Range Anti-ship Missile. The problem is a bit more widespread than that.
The only active US over the horizon anti-ship missile right now is the Harpoon. And the Harpoon has some serious issues. First, it is old. Sure, much of it has been upgraded over the years, but the basic technology is still a generation in the past. It has a fairly short range, roughly in the neighborhood of 75 miles. Against a top tier opponent (say, China) that may well mean the launching platform has to close within range of the target’s surface to air or surface to surface missile envelope. The whole point of standoff weapons is to avoid that.
Nor is the Harpoon stealthy. More recent missile programs have addressed enemy point defenses by generally one of two methods. First, make a really fast missile. That reduces the target’s available reaction time. The Russo-Indian Brahmos supersonic ASM uses this approach. The other method is to make the missile somewhat stealthy, thereby reducing the detection range. That similarly reduces the target’s available reaction time.
One other issue that Lt. Glynn touches upon is the numbers of ships that even carry Harpoon. It wasn’t so long ago that every major surface combatant in our fleet carried it. Perry class frigates, Spruance class destroyers, the nuclear cruisers as well as the Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers. As well, the first batch of DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Aegis destroyers carried Harpoon. But of most of those ships are gone, or soon will be. The Navy still has 22 Ticos, and the early Burkes. The Perry class has been stripped of its missile capability. The later construction Burkes had to give something up to fit a helo hangar aboard, and the Harpoon launcher was it. They do have a limited surface to surface capability using their SM-2 missiles, but that is range limited to the radar horizon, and its warhead is quite small, and not designed for attacking ships.
In short, just as the Navy is again beginning to face a serious blue water threat, it finds itself with very limited means of actually sinking enemy surface ships. Since World War II, the Navy has (with good reason) considered the submarine and the airplane as the two primary methods of destroying enemy ships. And that likely will remain the case. But it cannot afford to risk not having a robust surface warfare capability against a near peer blue water fleet.
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How a pair of cadets from Alabama started the 1826 Eggnog Riot at West Point | AL.com
Roberts, Burnley and Center managed to get the alcohol into the north barracks and, on Christmas Eve, the cadets spiked a batch of eggnog and proceeded to get drunk. The original group of nine cadets, including a young man named Jefferson Davis, was joined by more cadets, and still more, until soon dozens were staggering through the halls, some armed with muskets and bayonets.
via How a pair of cadets from Alabama started the 1826 Eggnog Riot at West Point | AL.com.
**waves at Blaster**
This is one year I don’t have eggnog or fruitcake.
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What holiday? Work goes on for some in military communities – News – Stripes
It’s two days before Christmas and Pfc. Ninotchka TorresSenal is cutting up vegetables and bread in the kitchen of Landstuhl Regional Medical Center and putting the pieces into various bins.
About to spend her first Christmas away from home and family and friends, the 26-year-old Army brat from Hampton, Va., said she expects to spend that day chopping and slicing as well.
“It’s just another day,” she said, musing that she hadn’t ever considered what the holidays would be like in the Army, even though her stepfather — a career soldier — had missed at least four Christmases that she can remember.
via What holiday? Work goes on for some in military communities – News – Stripes.
The cooks, especially, work hard on Christmas. Quite a few times I’ve eaten in the mess hall for Christmas, and every time it has been a spectacular meal. Thanks, guys.
