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Busy, Busy
Gonna be tied up a few hours with family stuff. Hope to post real content later. In the meantime, here’s a pic I stole from the comments at CDR Sal’s.
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U.S. naval ship grounded off Japanese coast – CNN.com
An American naval cargo ship has run aground off the Japanese coast, east of Okinawa, and efforts are underway to refloat it, the U.S. Navy said Thursday.
“The safety of the civilian crew members and the environment are our top priorities. So we’re taking this situation very seriously and will continue to investigate the situation until it’s resolved,” said Cmdr. William Marks, spokesman for the U.S. Navy 7th Fleet.
via U.S. naval ship grounded off Japanese coast – CNN.com.
Well, that’s not good.
MSC operates, among many other things, a fleet of sealift ships manned by civilian mariners to support military operations worldwide. This is one of them.
Given the perennial shortage of sealift, one hopes very much that she can be safely refloated and repaired soon.

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The Real Military Threat from China: Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles | The National Interest
“Air-Sea Battle” with Chinese Characteristics: a large fleet of land-based aircraft armed with some of the world’s most advanced anti-ship cruise missiles.
Lyle J. Goldstein
January 22, 2015
During the 1982 Falklands War, Argentina possessed a measly total of five Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles with which to face down the Royal Navy in the South Atlantic. Had that number been more like 50 or 100, that conflict might well have had a very different ending. This important lesson has not been lost on China’s military chiefs. Indeed, China has placed great emphasis on anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) development over the last three decades and is now set to reap the strategic benefits of this singular focus.
via The Real Military Threat from China: Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles | The National Interest.
Mr. Goldstein is indeed correct that large inventory of Chinese ASCM present a greater threat to US surface fleets in the Western Pacific than probably any other single Chinese weapon system.
But his analysis is too focused on the arrows in the quiver, and not enough on the eye of the Archer.
The huge numbers of cruise missiles are useless if rather precise information is lacking on the location, course, and speed of the intended target. And for all of China’s impressive improvements in maritime strike capability over the last three decades, their investments in maritime patrol aircraft and other targeting systems seem decidedly lacking.
To be sure, to influence the course of events ashore, a power projection navy such as ours must eventually close the coast, coming within easy sensor range of an enemy. But the great virtue of seapower here is the initiative to choose the time and place for such strikes.
That’s not to say the US Navy should simply assume it can easily better the Chinese. It shouldn’t. But it is a caution to the reader to not magnify the threat beyond all reason.
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Guantánamo base commander relieved of duty – Navy – Stripes
MIAMI (Tribune News Service) — Capt. John “J.R.” Nettleton, the commander of the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, has been removed from the remote outpost and reassigned to headquarters, the Navy announced Wednesday, but it declined to elaborate because of an ongoing Naval Criminal Investigative Services probe.
The announcement follows a mysterious death on the base being investigated by NCIS. A commissary worker named Christopher Tur, 42, was found dead in the waters of Guantanamo Bay at about 11:30 a.m. Jan. 10, Mike Andrews, a Navy Region Southeast spokesman, told the Miami Herald on Jan. 15. He had been reported missing a day earlier.
via Guantánamo base commander relieved of duty – Navy – Stripes.
Well, this will get interesting.
By the way, as the article notes, the Base Commander isn’t in charge of the units on base. Rather, he’s like the innkeeper, providing services to the tennant units stationed there, such as housing, public works, personnel support and commissary and exchange activities.
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BUTTERBAR — Medium
Expectations. On the average morning, expectations are not usually the first thing that comes to mind. My mornings are typically a frantic mix of exercise, coffee, and news; expectations are never more distant. But recently I found myself responding to a message from an Army ROTC cadet that peaked my interest, and thoughts of my own expectations of young leaders. His message touched on the now infamous Best Defense post from Army First Lieutenant Max Lujan, raising a concern that many of his peers didn’t believe they held a clear grasp of the expectations others would have of them once they were commissioned.
They know they are supposed to lead, they have a general idea of how to lead, but what will be expected of them when they actually lead others? How are they supposed to lead more experienced formations? Combat veterans? Non-commissioned officers?
via BUTTERBAR — Medium.
On the off chance there’s a young Cadet or Lieutenant reading this, and not reading Doctrine Man regularly, here’s DM’s thoughts on expectations for a new Platoon Leader.
I have, of course, a couple thoughts of my own.
First, a bad platoon leader doesn’t listen to his NCOs, particularly his Platoon Sergeant.
Second, the really bad platoon leader lets his NCOs, particularly his Platoon Sergeant, lead the platoon.
Yes, the smart Lieutenant works hand in glove with his NCOs, particularly his PSG, to lead the platoon. But at the end of the day, it is the Lieutenant that is in charge. He’s wise to solicit advice from his NCOs, but he alone must make the decisions, based on that advice, the guidance from his commander, and his assessment of the situation. That applies tactically, and in garrison. The only way to learn to lead well, it to get out front and lead.
One of my very first platoon leaders was also my very best (who went on to a fairly distinguished career). In garrison, he rarely gave an order, that we could see. Instead, he’d gather the PSG, and if appropriate the squad leaders, and issue his orders. We troops in the ranks received our orders in turn from the PSG and squad leaders. But the Lieutenant was there, watching over the evolution. That both reinforced the NCOs authority, and left little doubt in anyone’s mind that the PSG was taking his cues from the Lieutenant. As an added bonus, if the PSG felt the need to tell our young Lieutenant that he was proposing something stupid, the PSG could give his advice away from the eyes and ears of the junior soldiers.
In the field, of course, the Lieutenant was a bit more direct about giving orders. The chain of command is simple. The Lieutenant gives orders to the squad leaders, who then execute. Again, the smart leader does so in consultation with his PSG. A Private might snark about having more experience than the Lieutenant, but in reality, most young platoon leaders are reasonably well trained in the doctrine and tactics of their branch by the time they reach their first duty station assignment. Provided our young leader is not an especially caustic personality, most troops are happy to display and share their expertise to bring the new officer up to speed on the technical details required to perform well. When I was a nearly new Bradley gunner, I was happy to help train my new platoon leader on the finer points of Bradley gunnery.
DM’s points about what your troops can expect:
The other half of this equation is what they expect from you. They need a leader who can make decisions, who leads by example, and who isn’t afraid to roll up his or her sleeves and get dirty when the time comes. They need a leader who is tough, but fair. They need a leader who is calm in the face of the storm. They need a leader who is worthy of their trust, their respect, their loyalty. Earn it.
Emphasis mine. Make. A. Damn. Decision. Most decisions you make are not life and death. They’re mundane and have little in the way of positive or negative outcome. But if you can’t make small decisions, the life and death decisions are infinitely harder to make, which is a default decision to do nothing, and tends to get people killed.
The rest of that paragraph is a long way of saying, have integrity. Your troops assume you have that, right up until you show then you don’t. If you don’t, if you lose that trust, you’ll never regain it. Find a new line of work.
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About that War is Boring Article on the Bradley…
Spill nudged me about this post at War is Boring about the Army wanting to replace the Bradley some 38 years ago.
The U.S. Army Wanted to Replace the Bradley 38 Years Ago
And of course, the movie The Pentagon Wars makes an appearance.
Thanks to the famous made-for-TV movie The Pentagon Wars, many Americans are aware of the problems with the U.S. Army’s Bradley fighting vehicle.
………….
In 1977, Congress wanted to know if the new armored personnel carrier could survive a fight against Soviet forces in Europe. By that time, the Army had worked on the Bradley—while repeatedly changing its requirements—for years.
“The Army requires an infantry righting vehicle [and] the design of the IFV is acceptable,” concludes an Army study, which the Pentagon declassified in 2003, and recently released online at the Army’s Heritage and Education Center.
The Bradley would enter service. But now legislators wanted plans for a better design that could be ready within the decade.
Every fighting vehicle is a compromise among several traits. Speed, survivability, protection, signature, lethality, weight, and affordability all have to be weighed in the balance. Another critical factor is time. That is, the time needed to study, propose, design, test, manufacture, and field a weapon system.
Let’s also note that the article refutes its own premise. The Army wasn’t looking to replace the Bradley even as it first started to roll off the production line. Congress was mandating the Army conduct a study. That’s a horse of a somewhat different color.
The Army asked itself back in the late 1970s and early 1980s not whether the Bradley was a perfect vehicle, but rather, is the Bradley a more effective vehicle for the threat we face than the current M113 Armored Personnel carrier?
Having served in units equipped with both, let me assure you the answer to that question was unquestionably an emphatic YES!
From the article:
The problem was that future Soviet tanks might turn the Bradleys into veritable coffins. If World War III broke out, the U.S. could face Russian armored beasts with huge main guns, long-range missiles and thick armor.
“In the 1987 time frame, the Warsaw Pact 130-division force … would contain more than 34,000 tanks, the majority being T-72s, with a good proportion of the successor tank,” the Army’s study warns.
Well, duh. That’s why the Army was also fielding the M1 Abrams tank. And that snippet above also doesn’t mention that tens of thousands of BMP Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and BTR Armored Personnel Carriers that would accompany any fleet of Soviet tanks plunging through the Fulda Gap. You know, the very BMPs and BTRs the Bradley was optimized to destroy? With the Bradleys smoking BMPs and BTRs, then the M1 tanks would be free to concentrate on killing the hordes of T-72 tanks the Army study mentioned.
The article goes on to examine possible Bradley replacements, and manages to compare them to the German Marder and other allied Infantry Fighting Vehicles. What it doesn’t quite manage to make clear to the reader is that those vehicles are very much comparable to the Bradley in terms of armor. None had the heavy, tank like armor the article implies.
The problem with installing tank like armor on an Infantry Fighting Vehicle is pretty soon, you have a tank, and the problem of fitting infantry into it is even worse than cramming dismounts into the back of a Bradley.
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Editorial: Ensure Success of New Frigates
After years of criticism, debate and angst, the US Navy appears to — finally — have embraced the littoral combat ships that will prove to be a critical element of its surface force.
To address persistent concerns that both versions of the speedy warship were too lightly armed and vulnerable, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel ordered the Navy to study alternatives and capped the program at 32 ships.
Unsurprisingly, the Navy proposed adding weapons and improving the survivability of the last 20 ships of the class, referring to them as small surface combatants.
Critics maintain the changes will do little to improve the utility of the LCS while increasing unit cost by tens of millions of dollars apiece.
via Editorial: Ensure Success of New Frigates.
Just imagine what the Navy could have done in terms of designing a new frigate if it had never indulged in the poorly thought out LCS program in the first place.
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WWII 'Devil's Brigade' to receive medal
A World War II Special Forces unit will be presented with the Congressional Gold Medal in Washington, D.C., next month.
House Speaker John Boehner announced that the U.S.-Canadian 1st Special Service Force, known as the “Devil’s Brigade,” will be honored Feb. 3 in a ceremony in the U.S. Capitol’s Emancipation Hall, according to the Waterloo-Cedar Falls Courier.
via WWII ‘Devil’s Brigade’ to receive medal.
The 1st Special Service Force was one of the most remarkable units in World War II. As an aside, they generally preferred the moniker The Braves.
We enjoyed the Cliff Robertson movie as much as the next guy, but the real story of 1SSF is so much more interesting, and deserves a fuller account than the movie could give.
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T-45's departing KPSP
It’s hard to get a good pic with just the phone.
Gee. A cross country training flight over a holiday weekend. Where to go?
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Yemen's president held captive; U.S. sends Navy warships to Red Sea – Washington Times
Yemen President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi is being held captive by rebels who have attacked his compound, just as the U.S. military has moved the USS Iwo Jima and the USS Fort McHenry into the Red Sea, in position to take aboard evacuees from the U.S. Embassy in Yemen if tensions and violence continue to escalate.
Various media have also reported that the presidential compound is under attack and Shiite Houthi rebels, backed by Iran, are holding the Yemeni president captive.
via Yemen’s president held captive; U.S. sends Navy warships to Red Sea – Washington Times.
It was just a couple months ago that the Obama administration was touting Yemen as a model of a successful counter-terror strategy.
Of course, maybe this is what they consider success.
