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Hillary Clinton and the Washington Naval Treaty
In the aftermath of the slaughterhouse that was World War I, one of the major causes of the war was seen by contemporary powers as the massive naval arms race before the war, particularly between Great Britain and the Kaiser’s Germany. You have to remember, battleships were the nuclear weapons of their day, capable of astonishing destruction, and a huge investment of national resources. Modern nuclear strategists know of the “use ‘em or lose ‘em” conundrum that surrounds the question of using nuclear weapons. Much the same issue faced naval powers with regards to battleships.
In the immediate aftermath of World War I, therefore, not a few people were quite alarmed at the fact that a new naval arms race was already underway. The US had passed a law calling for a massive increase in our own battlefleet. Great Britain, in spite of the appalling losses, both in lives and treasure she had lost in the Great War, was determined to maintain at least parity, if not superiority of the naval power that enabled Rule Britannia. Japan, a latecomer to the industrial revolution, nonetheless was economically growing at an astonishing rate, and saw itself as the rightful hegemon of the western Pacific, a role that obviously called for a world class navy, one they were quite busy building.
For reasons mostly of domestic politics, the Harding administration proposed a conference to limit the building of capital ships such as battleships, battlecruisers, and aircraft carriers. The Washington Naval Conference was the first major arms control summit ever. And of course, it was a huge diplomatic effort. And where diplomacy goes, so goes espionage.
Do we need to review the rest of the history of compromised communications during World War II such as Enigma and the Fleet Radio Unit Pacific? How about the XX Committee? Suffice to say that the penetration of enemy communications during the war was an astonishing triumph of Allied intelligence operations, and materially affected the course of the war.
Hillary Clinton’s emails have already been compromised by a private hacker known as Guccifer. It simply must be assumed that the entirety of her email was also compromised by other foreign powers.
We’re hardly the only one to show concern about Hillary Clinton’s compromised communications.
Further, once one end of communications security is breached, it make it far easier to breach the other end, and then spread through the network. The entire point of having secure government networks is to, well, keep them secure. While the NSA is currently busy monitoring the emails and cellphone communications of vast swaths of our citizenry, it should be scrambling to determine if, and how far, the integrity of our nation’s networks have been breached.
And while no one expected much in the way of competence from anyone in the Obama administration in terms of foreign policy and negotiations, how much of the brazen contempt our opponents and adversaries have shown us is because they already know what the US response will be?
Many Democrats (and Hillary’s water carriers in the press) will be quick to defend her, claiming the political attacks are simply an attempt to derail her presumptive run for the presidency. But shouldn’t actions by a political figure that have negative national security implication invite political attack, and carry political consequences? Particularly since the only plausible explanation for Mrs. Clinton’s use of her unusual email system was to hide from discovery by the public and legitimate government oversight information that might be used against her politically.
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The President Talks Gun Control
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At 18, Buffy the Vampire Slayer Is Still Revolutionary — The Atlantic
Eighteen years ago, Buffy the Vampire Slayer aired for the first time on The WB in a two-part debut. “Welcome to the Hellmouth” introduced viewers to Buffy Summers (Sarah Michelle Gellar), a likable, popular 16-year-old who just happened to have a destiny that included saving the world from the undead; while also introducing Buffy to Sunnydale, a small, run-of-the-mill California town that just happened to sit on a Hellmouth—a portal of mystical energy that attracts demons, vampires, and other boogeymen.
via At 18, Buffy the Vampire Slayer Is Still Revolutionary — The Atlantic.
Happy Birthday to BtVS, one of my favorite series ever.
The article in the Atlantic doesn’t specifically address it, but the show is an excellent portrayal of the burdens of duty. Beyond those burdens imposed on her by fate, Buffy also freely, if reluctantly, often assumes duties that those outside might consider optional, but which she sees as central to her vision of herself as a decent person. -
Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb
Boeing, in developing the second generation of the Small Diameter Bomb, which adds a tri-mode seeker to the concept of the existing GPS/INS SDB, recognized that the hard part of designing a precision weapon is the guidance. The airframe and warhead are usually rather straightforward. And they also had the bright idea to strap a rocket booster to the back of the SDB II, and introduce a ground launched version.
Even better, they were able to use the existing booster from original style rockets of the long serving M270 MLRS. That keeps costs down. Plus, the MLRS system’s existing infrastructure reduces costs and training needed.
While the current GPS/INS guided unitary warhead GMLRS system is fine, it is also unable to accurately target moving targets. The SDB II was designed to strike moving targets. That’s going to increase the ability to hold at risk enemy high value/high payoff targets such as air defense systems.
We also wonder how long it will be until someone discusses the potential for coastal defense, or even a ship launched variant as an anti-ship missile system.
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More on the squandering of airpower
As a followup to the earlier post, here’s an email making the rounds from an A-10 driver.
Subject: A-10 driver perspective
Date: March 6, 2015 at 4:16:21 PM ESTFYSA
The squadron is doing fine. Everybody is happy to be here and we are doing some good work. The A-10s are holding up well and the technology we have have on the jets now (targeting pods, GPS guided bombs, Laser Guided bombs, Laser guided missiles, tactical data link, satellite comms), and of course the gun, make the A-10 ideal for this conflict. We are killing off as many ISIS as we can, mostly in ones and twos, working with the hand we are dealt. I’ve never been more convicted in my career that we facing an enemy that needs to be eradicated.
With that being said…I’ve never been more frustrated in my career. After 13 years of the mind-numbing low intensity conflict in Afghanistan, I’ve never seen the knife more dull. All the hard lessons learned in Vietnam, and fixed during the first Gulf War, have been unlearned again. The level of centralized execution, bureaucracy, and politics is staggering. I basically do not have any decision making authority in my cockpit. It sucks. In most cases, unless a general officer can look at a video picture from a UAV, over a satellite link, I cannot get authority to engage. I’ve spent many hours, staring through a targeting pod screen in my own cockpit, watching ISIS perpetrate their acts until my eyes bleed, without being able to do anything about it. The institutional fear of making a mistake, that has crept into the central mindset of the military leadership, is endemic. We have not taken the fight to these guys. We haven’t targeted their centers of gravity in Raqqa. All the roads between Syria and Iraq are still intact with trucks flowing freely. The other night I watched a couple hundred small tanker trucks lined up at an oilfield in ISIS-held northeast Syria, presumably filling up with with oil traded on the black market, go unfettered. It’s not uncommon to wait several hours overhead a suspected target for someone to make a decision to engage or not. It feels like we are simply using the constructs build up in Afghanistan, which was a very limited fight, in the same way here against ISIS, which is a much more sophisticated and numerically greater foe. It’s embarrassing.
Be assured that the Hawg drivers are doing their best.One of the prime arguments the Army Air Force used to have air component commanders co-equal to ground component commanders as far back as the campaigns in North Africa in World War II was that airpower benefited from centralized planning, but decentralized execution.
That is, where land component commanders tended to want an umbrella of fighter cover over deployed units all day long, air component commanders, taking a broader view of the air battle, would be able to see which target sets would take priority and be the highest payoff targets. That is, one day, airpower might best be devoted to knocking back enemy airfields, and the next interdicting bridges and trains. The inherent flexibility of airpower could, in the hands of a capable commander, be better used by shifting the priorities, something ground component commanders were not always cognizant of.
Of course, the flip side of that coin was that the execution had to be decentralized. If a raid on an airfield found it empty of enemy planes, the raid leader would call an audible and find other targets worthy of attack.
But today, the increasing trend of the four star squad leader is surely at play here. No one wants to be responsible for a massacre of civilians. But in the example given in the letter, the tanker trucks, laden with oil, are no doubt going to be used to smuggle illegal oil and fund the ISIS state. That makes them a legitimate target, whether they’re manned by civilians or not. Which, let’s face it, our enemies here aren’t exactly adhering to every nicety of the laws of warfare. Why should we unilaterally and arbitrarily handicap ourselves with an overabundance of caution, particularly when the laws of warfare were set up to encourage reciprocity, not reward one side for violations.
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Boyd, and Patterns of Conflict, Now with Video!
To say that John Boyd has a following would be an understatement. There’s the followers, and then there’s the cult. I’m a follower.
Jason Brown, studying Boyd during his professional military education, not only read everything he could find on Boyd, he also uncovered video of his Patterns of Conflict briefing. For you who aren’t terribly familiar with him, Boyd didn’t write essays or white papers, or books. He gave presentations. That had a great impact on the audience, and was of immediate impact. But it also meant the written record of Boyd’s thinking was somewhat lacking.
Several years ago, I tracked down a rare video of Boyd delivering “Patterns of Conflict,” the famous (and lengthy) briefing that framed his theory of warfare. At the urging of some junior officers (and a little technical coaching), I recently uploaded the video to YouTube. While my views on Boyd have matured over the years, the videos reveal the sage discourse I sought from him, as well as prudent counsel appropriate for today.
I think it would be fair to say the Marine Corps bought into Boydian concepts, most importantly the OODA Loop, more than any other service. And that’s fine.
My frustration has been that over the years, not a few cult members have chided the Army for failing to simply rewrite all its doctrine based on Boyd’s OODA Loop briefing. Mind you, this was back in the day when AirLand Battle was still, essentially, the operative doctrine guiding the US Army.
Almost invariably, further questioning of the cultist would reveal that while they could say the words Observe, Orient, Decide and Act, they knew little or nothing of AirLand Battle (ALB), or its evolution from the previous doctrine, Active Defense.
There is little evidence that Boyd had anything to do, even indirectly, with the genesis of ALB. Interestingly, though, we can see some very clear parallels between the OODA Loop and the fundamentals of ALB. The fundamental concepts of Initiative, Depth, Agility, and Synchronization easily harmonize with the concepts of the OODA Loop.
That’s not to say OODA Loop and ALB were competing, but rather that a grounded understanding of the OODA Loop and Patterns of Conflict made grasping the true precepts of ALB much easier, and led to better implementation.
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Steam Powered Airplanes
In the first third of the 20th Century, steam engineering was, in many ways, far more advanced than internal combustion engineering. Of course, steam power was a much more mature technology at the time. It makes some sense then that someone would attempt to use it to power another new technology, one very dependent on reliable power, the airplane.
Of course, the rapid improvements in conventional gasoline powerplants for airplanes left the steam powered aircraft as little more than an odd footnote in history.
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Royal Maces
It’s become something of a tradition in the last decade or so that each squadron of an air wing produces a highlight reel of video from its last cruise. The widespread introduction of GoPro cameras, video editing software, and high quality HUD tapes have made for ever increasing quality cruise videos. VFA-27, The Royal Maces, fly the F/A-18E Hornet as part of Air Wing Five, and are permanently forward deployed to Japan, and operate from the USS George Washington. And they’ve got a nice teaser trailer for their next cruise video.
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Climbing the rigging, underway.
I shared video of a US Navy sailor laying aloft aboard the USS Constitution recently. As noted, it’s one thing to take the lubber’s hole on a nice sunny day, while safely moored. Here’s what it looks like underway.
Jannik Rathke was, apparently a student aboard the sail training vessel Sorlandet, which was operating as a part of a maritime school in Canada.
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The U.S. is squandering its airpower – The Washington Post
Ever since the Islamic State swept in to fill the void left by President Obama’s withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq, the debate over how to respond to this new threat has centered on two false and overly simplistic choices: Are airstrikes alone enough to do the job, or will it take a major commitment of U.S. “boots on the ground”?
At one extreme, the president complained last month that his critics would have him put “tens of thousands” of U.S. troops back into Iraq. Yet no serious proponent of using U.S. ground forces to counter the Islamic State has suggested that any such response should demand that many combatants. On the other side of the debate, no serious advocate of an air-centric alternative has suggested that U.S. airpower can suffice unaided by a ground presence. What remains unexplored in earnest in this regard is the appropriate mix of air and land involvement to leverage our strongest comparative advantages from the air without risking a return of our troops to high-intensity close combat on the ground.
via The U.S. is squandering its airpower – The Washington Post.
Ideally, airpower and landpower are synergistic. In practice, tis not always so.
The greatest problem tactical airpower has traditionally faced is targeting. Simply flying over the enemy’s land, and struggling to identify worthwhile targets is wasteful. The enemy, in this case ISIS, uses dispersal, camouflage and deception to hide from the eye in the sky. The rather fleeting nature of tactical airpower also means that the enemy can mass and disperse almost at will. If the sky is clear of our planes, he’s free to maneuver. If our jets are overhead, a momentary dispersal renders him mostly safe.
Landpower, however, had the ability to uncover worthy targets, and force the enemy to mass, less he be destroyed in detail. Unfortunately, landpower often lacks the ability to mass effective fires quickly on fleeting targets of opportunity.
Of course, an additional burden on the current air campaign is the Rules of Engagement. While they’re not public information, one has the sneaking suspicion they are as constrictive, or more so, as other campaigns the US has recently fought. But while minimizing the possibility of any neutral casualties, to the point of risking friendly lives, makes sense in a counterinsurgency campaign, conducted by the US, where the goodwill of the local population is critical, it certainly makes less sense in the campaign against ISIS. That doesn’t mean we should kill willy nilly, and damn the body count. But it does mean that we should err on the side of killing the enemy, and not so tie ourselves in knots of red tape that we’re simply doing no good at great expense.
If you’re going to fight the war, fight the damn war.
