XBradTC

Via War on the Rocks

Military aviation circles are awash in the glow of the competition for the coveted Air Force contract for the OA-X, a cheap to acquire and cheap to operate counter insurgency aircraft. Some see the OA-X as a cost effective and more attenuated alternative to provide close air support (CAS) to ground troops. However, the success of OA-X will inherently be limited as it was conceived to support the U.S. military as it was operating nine years ago in Afghanistan. The world has since moved on, and warfare with it. The first limitation to the OA-X is due to the fact that the uncontested airspace which defined our air war over Afghanistan and Iraq is quickly disappearing, increasing the risk to its pilots. Secondly, its tactical abilities cannot overcome the political limitations which will reduce its use on the battlefield. Lastly, the manning shortfall in the Air Force will be exacerbated by a massive OA-X buy and not relieve pressure on its pilot shortage as advertised.

Major Chitwood raises some very salient points. 

My thoughts? First, I think there very much is still a place in the force structure for a light attack/ISR platform. And secondly, the entire OA-X saga is a lesson in missed opportunities. Had the Air Force recognized in 2001 that such a platform would be far better suited to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq than, say, F-15E Strike Eagles, they could have quickly fielded such a weapon, at minimal cost. Instead, we've exhausted the airframes not only of our strike fighters, but also our tanker fleet making circles in the sky.