XBradTC

Via the Tactical Leader

Though most tactical leaders intuitively understand that their reconnaissance and security formations can conduct either stealthy or aggressive reconnaissance depending on the situation, we are currently out-of-balance. Many formations remain overly-reliant on echelons above brigade (EAB and organic unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to collect the information needed to inform the Commander’s decision-making. The results are underwhelming. The ‘see first, decide first, act first, finish decisively’ paradigm is one that has proven ineffective against an intelligent enemy well-trained in the use of camouflage, concealment, and dispersion techniques to defeat these platforms. Stealthy reconnaissance by ground forces holds more promise in overcoming these passive counter-reconnaissance techniques. Stealthy reconnaissance by ground forces are well-suited to identify the flanks and rear of enemy formations, allowing follow-on maneuver forces to achieve shock and surprise and exploit both physical and psychological positions of relative advantage. And yet, preparing and training formations almost exclusively in the conduct of passive, stealthy reconnaissance leaves the formation out-of-balance in respect to its capabilities. The ability to conduct aggressive reconnaissance is an essential proficiency in large-scale combat operations. Formations must train both. This post seeks to highlights considerations in favor of conducting aggressive reconnaissance that a tactical leader should use to inform their model of reconnaissance.

As a line grunt at the platoon level, I was usually more involved in the counter-reconnaissance fight, rather than the reconnaissance effort.

Fighting the CR fight allowed me to infer a few things.

Having to devote resources, and time, to denying the enemy reconnaissance effort meant our unit had fewer resources and less time to devote to the main effort- usually the defense, but often enough preparations for the attack. As much as a third of the task force would be devoted to the CR effort.

For relatively modest forces fighting the recon battle, the OpFor could tie up our task force with minimal risk. As soon as his reconnaissance forces made contact, they would almost immediately break contact, reposition, and advance once again in another sector.

Eventually, after multiple contacts, the enemy reconnaissance effort would be able to fairly accurately map our CR effort. And by  painting a picture of how we were attempting to deny  him reconnaissance, a savvy enemy  commander would be able to infer where our actual defense was. Given that our order of battle was known, and that the OpFor was intimately familiar with the terrain, and our doctrine, guessing the design of our defense was no great mental stretch.

If, however, we were able to destroy early on the enemy reconnaissance effort, before they could map the entirety of the CR effort, the enemy ability to infer  our defense was greatly compromised.