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Over at War on the Rocks, retired Air Force Colonel Mike Pietrucha takes a look at the history of light aircraft adapted for the low end of the spectrum for the attack mission:

There has been a recent flurry of press attention on OA-X, an Air Force effort to obtain off-the-shelf light attack aircraft.  Sen. McCain’s recent publication of Restoring American Power — which calls for the Air Force to acquire 300 light attack aircraft — will no doubt intensify interest in the idea, with many constituencies trying to define OA-X for their own benefit and profit.  Appearing to emerge out of the blue, the idea has garnered some degree of instant opposition, not all of it informed.  The OA-X is already well-defined. It is the result of an effort that started nine years ago in the height of the surge in Iraq and is regaining currency as a result of the expanding use of airpower to engage violent extremist organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere.  Like many good ideas, it has as its genesis another successful effort from the past. Contrary to popular opinion, the Department of Defense can be remarkably good at turning to successful historical examples.

In 1966, the Air Force found itself in a conundrum.  As the United States slid deeper into Southeast Asia, the Air Force’s stable of fighters was dominated by fast-moving fighters designed for high-intensity conflict with the Soviets, including an expected exchange of nuclear weapons.  Aircraft like the F-101 and F-105 were optimized for the nuclear strike role but not for conventional counterland missions.  Our true multirole fighter, the mighty Phantom II, was an adaptation of a Navy fleet defense fighter. The Tactical Fighter Experimental, a joint program forced on the U.S. Air Force and Navy by Secretary of Defense Robert S. MaNamara, was encountering problems in flight testing.  The Navy variant would be cancelled in 1968.  The Air Force was left without a modern attack capability and was forced to use a Korean-Vintage A-1 Skyraider that had been retired by the Navy.

Nine years. And not one squadron on the ramp.

What’s infuriating is that the Air Force could have been pushing on an open door in 2007 for funds to buy these planes. Essentially, the choice was between the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, and the Beechcraft AT-6C Texan II. The Boeing OV-10X restart was an outside possibility.

Seriously, while each platform had its strengths and weaknesses, any would have been an acceptable choice. Buying them in reasonable (300) numbers would have seen them begin to enter squadron service within three to four years. And having them in the inventory would lead to some nice side effects. One major benefit would be the reduced demand signal for fast jet attack aircraft such as the F-16 and F-15E Strike Eagle.  That would mean the flight hours they’re currently using to fly oval racetracks over Afghanistan could instead been husbanded for training, or used in higher threat environments, such as Libya or Syria. The lowered operational tempo of having a larger force would also very likely helped stem some of the bleeding of talent the Air Force is currently struggling with.

As an added bonus, Air Force adoption of such a system would also likely increase the prospects of friendly nations buying additional aircraft, and increasing interoperability.

One suspects the Air Force was concerned that adoption of a low cost solution to 80% of its problems would have had an adverse effect on the procurement of the F-35 Lightning. We think that is unlikely. What it would have done is removed some of the pressure to concurrently develop and build the jet, which has been the source of more than a few of the issues the Lightning has faced.

Most importantly, from where I sit, the failure of the services to adopt a low cost solution is simply another manifestation of a procurement system that is so sclerotic that it simply cannot provide the force with weapon systems in anything approaching a timely manner.