XBradTC

Hey, if I have to spend 10 minutes writing an email to a friend about strategy (and 10 minutes reading about it!), I’m not going to let that go to waste. In reply to a friend’s email on the subject of Clausewitz and strategy, I had this to say:

As to the Center of Gravity, I’m reminded of the Transportation Plan argument of early 1944. The Army Air Force was thinking strategically, and clearly the most remunerative target for bombardment was oil production. Oil production was the center of gravity as far as they were concerned. No oil, no fighting.  But the problem was, they were thinking strategically in isolation. That is, what is the most remunerative target for bombers?

The real strategic thinkers understood that strategically, the Allied forces had to land in northern Europe and come to grips with the Wehrmacht and destroy it.

And the only way to do that was to land in Normandy. And to successfully secure a beachhead that would support such an offensive meant that enemy logistics had to be sufficiently disrupted that the Allies could build up their forces (on exterior lines of communication) than the Germans could on interior lines. And so the Transportation Plan won. And for over 60 years, the airpower guys have complained about attacking tactical (really, operational) level targets. But attacking tactical or operational targets to ensure fulfillment of a strategic objective is, in the end, good strategy. Because, in the end, the Wehrmacht was truly the German center of gravity. No Wehrmacht, no fighting.