Conventional Submarines an Answer for the US Navy?

Historian Torsten Heinrich at The Diplomat makes some excellent points. The United States hasn’t produced any conventional submarines since the Barbel-class in the late 1950s; every submarine class since then has been nuclear powered. This might have made sense in the context of the Cold War, where Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines had to be…

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Historian Torsten Heinrich at The Diplomat makes some excellent points.

The United States hasn’t produced any conventional submarines since the Barbel-class in the late 1950s; every submarine class since then has been nuclear powered. This might have made sense in the context of the Cold War, where Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines had to be shadowed, but times have changed.

While previously conventional submarines had to snorkel roughly at least every two days of time under water to recharge their batteries, air-independent propulsion (AIP) has changed the game. German Type 212 submarines can stay under water without snorkeling for up to three weeks, traveling 1,500 miles (2,400 kilometers) or more. Without emitting heat and with no need for constant cooling due to the lack of a nuclear reactor, these German submarines and comparable designs are more than a match for nuclear-powered submarines in terms of stealthiness.

As any US submariner will tell you, the acoustic signature of AIP boats is a significant challenge for US detection capabilities.  On top of that, China is building a network of surveillance and detection systems across the expanse of the First Island Chain.  Satellites, ASW helicopter bases, and possibly a version of the US SOSUS network, all concentrated in a relatively small portion of the Western Pacific, all increase the chances that US SSNs will find it increasingly difficult to transit and operate undetected and untargeted.  Besides, we haven't sufficient SSNs proportional to our reliance upon those assets in the event of a war at sea with the PLA Navy.  Conventional submarines are an attractive and sensible alternative to SSNs and could alleviate that situation, asserts Heinrich.

Whereas China can and will create a bigger subsurface fleet than the USN by mixing conventional submarines with nuclear powered ones, the financial burden of matching hull with hull is practically impossible for the United States, at least as long as it limits the USN to SSNs. Conventional submarines might change this.

While one Virginia-class submarine costs roughly $2.7 billion per unit, the same money could buy six to seven conventional submarines of the German Type 212 class.

Heinrich makes some other valid points about the potential to keep shipyards employed, and the export potential of such boats.  Well worth the read, and serious consideration.  I remember well the decommissioning of the last of the diesel boats, right around the time I pinned on Captain.  Conventional submarine propulsion technology is light years ahead of the Barbels, built in the late 1950s, and should be explored fully as a means of defeating a capable and growing enemy in the event of a war at sea, especially in the Western Pacific.

 

H/T:  Grandpa Bluewater (who else?)

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Responses to “Conventional Submarines an Answer for the US Navy?”

  1. Diogenes of NJ

    The Pacific is an exceeding large ocean. Nuclear power allows for high speed transits and permits SSNs to get to where they are needed quickly. Such as been a major part of the US Navy’s rational to employ an exclusively nuclear submarine fleet for the latter part of the 20th century, up to the present day.
    As talented as a modern nuclear submarine is, the one thing that it is unable to do is to be in two places at once (whereas the enemy can). If we could have significantly larger numbers of modern capable SS attack boats as opposed to many fewer SSNs, then I’d agree with GBW. With many more boats and modern communications we could experience a revival of wolf pack tactics.
    A less distinguished man once stated: “Quantity has a quality of it’s own.”

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  2. Krag

    Unless you can man five SSs with the same number of men it takes to man one SSN, this is not a good deal. Now add in the cost of the new oilers and tenders these SSs will require. Those new support ships have their own new crew requirements. Now add in the new shore establishment required to equip and manage the hardware, train the crew, and create/refine the doctrine for the skippers of these new SSs.
    Yes this puts more boats in the water, but its by no means a “cheap” solution. I imagine Laz would have a stroke at just the increased personnel costs alone. 🙂 I don’t see how this would be a wise move for an SSN-equipped Navy to embrace in a time of budgetary woe.

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  3. Diogenes of NJ

    @Krag – some excellent points. Fighting a war, especially a war at sea is by no means an economical endeavor. There is nothing more expensive however, than losing a war. The economic ramification persist for generations (the Confederate South comes to mind). That said, I think that most here will agree that that current world conditions and the outlook on the horizon dictate that US Military forces MUST be increased; especially our Navy and most of all our Submarine Force.
    One of the most intensive areas of training in submarining is the care and feeding of the nuclear reactor. Fully one half of an attack boat’s crew are nucs. Elimination of the nuclear reactor also eliminates the need for this training regime. As you know submariners are the best trained of all crews. The safety of the boat requires thorough and extensive crew cross training. WWII diesel boat crews were slightly smaller than modern attack boat crews, and there was a time when the number of non-nucs dominated sub personnel (not sure if that’s still the case, but clearly the nuc ratio has increased). As for maintenance and shore establishment, IMHO it’s about time that the Navy bring back tenders (both sub and surface craft); an invaluable asset for forward deployments.

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  4. ultimaratioregis

    @Krag,
    The crew size for a Type 212 is between 28 and 30, while a new Virginia is about 135. The ratio is about 1:4.5 for crew sizes. One has to wonder how many boat spaces can be freed up by reducing the number of Flag Officers by a third, with their concomitant staffs. Ditto the Diversity Directorate at Millington. And Diogenes makes some excellent points about crew training for reactors.

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  5. Quartermaster

    Glad of the tag at the end. I was pretty sure it wasn’t URR pinning on Captain that mattered here. 🙂
    You gonna be around more Gramps? Good to see you again!

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  6. ultimaratioregis

    Ahh, well. Part of the Navy’s biggest problem set is that their Captains increasingly don’t matter. Whereas a Marine Captain does…

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  7. ultimaratioregis

    Which is to say that I wrote the piece, referencing something I got from GPBW, which is why he gets the hat-tip.

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  8. Quartermaster

    Typepad does not automatically append the author’s label to a post. So, Howm I supposed to be able to tell it was just URR and not the distinguished GBW?

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  9. ultimaratioregis

    That you cannot tell the difference between GPBW and URR is very bad news for GPBW!!!!

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  10. grandpabluewater

    GPBW old. URR middle age. GPBW not small. URR BIG. GPBW has unpredictable and weird twisted sense of humor. URR humor usually below detectable threshold values. GPBW real Grandpa. URR…green amphibious monster.
    I could go on….

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  11. grandpabluewater

    Quartermaster: Here every day or so…have been for long time.

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