What would happen if U.S. nuclear attack submarines—some of the most sophisticated and expensive American weapons of war—suddenly became obsolete? Imagine a scenario where these important systems became the hunted instead of the hunter, or just as technologically backward as the massive battleships of years past. Think that sounds completely insane? If advances in big data and new detection methods fuse with the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) ambitions of nations like China and Russia, naval planners around the world might have to go back to the drawing board.
via Are Submarines About to Become Obsolete? | The National Interest.
Short answer- No.
Either the author (and the underlying study) don’t understand submarine warfare, or this is clickbait on a slightly higher intellectual plane than Buzzfeed.
Any of the possible solutions to detecting, localizing, tracking, classifying and targeting a submarine apply equally or more so to surface ships.
Further, the assertion that future technologies will soon render subs visible has been making the rounds forever. And yet, it never comes to fruition. Someday, it probably will. But at what cost? For a given area of ocean (say, the South China Sea) how many sensor platforms equipped with expensive sensors would be required to reliably target a given submarine? Can our potential enemies afford those platforms and sensors? What opportunity costs would these technologies impose on the threat nations? After all, yuan spent on hunting subs is yuan not available for some other program.
Further, the same advances in detection and targeting would apply just about evenly to their own forces, rending them vulnerable to our own counters, be they sub based or via some other method.
And in that lies one of our traditional strengths. The US has long embraced combined arms. While that’s traditionally thought of in Army terms, from the integration of infantry and artillery up to more complex scenarios, the fact is, the US has for a very long time excelled the rest of the world in leveraging the whole of its military capabilities in a synergistic system of systems that yield an effectiveness that outstrips our opponents.
For instance, in World War II, the US operated fast carrier task forces, amphibious forces and submarine forces, all supported by a submarine campaign, in parallel, with each facet reinforcing the effects of the others.
It is a mistake all to many defense observers make to look at one platform, one weapon, in isolation, and ignore that the platform, the weapon is merely part of a much larger methodology of war.
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